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RESPONDING TO AN UNFORESEEN 
VARIATION:  WHY OHIO SHOULD PROVIDE A 
STATUTORY RIGHT OF RESCISSION TO ALL 
DEFRAUDED PARTIES IN A STOCK-FOR-
STOCK EXCHANGE 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
This problem is further complicated by wide variations in administration, 
not only from state to state, but sometimes from case to case in a single state.1 
 
Consider two closely-held corporations in State O.  They agree to 
enter into an agreement whereby the shareholders of the acquiring 
corporation, A, provide to the shareholders of the target corporation, T, 
stock in corporation A in exchange for all stock and control in 
corporation T.2  The owners of T are considering retirement.  They are 
seeking interest from parties looking to acquire their corporation.  T 
expresses interest, so the two parties enter into lengthy negotiations.  A 
ensures T that A has many lucrative contracts, is involved in substantial 
growth and development, and has many stockholders; indeed, A 
represents to T that this exchange will provide sufficient compensation 
to T for T’s business. 
However, after A and T agree to the terms of the exchange, T 
becomes aware that A has grossly misrepresented the value of its 
corporation’s stock.  As it turns out, A’s corporation is in financial 
disarray.  A quickly depletes the assets it obtained from T, and the once-
successful business operations of T take a treacherous downward spiral 
due to A’s misdealings.  Left with nothing but worthless stock in A, the 
former owners of T seek rescission of the agreement pursuant to O’s 
state securities fraud statute in state court. 
Next, imagine an identical scenario in State O with two other parties, 
Y and Z.  Z, the target corporation, becomes aware of the 
misrepresentations and misdealings of Y, the acquiring corporation.  
However, instead of pursuing its state securities fraud action in state 
court, Z brings federal securities claims in addition to its state securities 
claims.  As a result, Y and Z litigate in federal court in State O.  Because 
                                                 
1 Alan M. Hoffman, Blue Skying an Issue, 13 HOW. L.J. 108, 108 (1967). 
2 This hypothetical is inspired by the facts and resulting securities fraud lawsuit in 
Murphy v. Stargate Defense Sys. Corp., 498 F.3d 386 (6th Cir. 2007).  In Murphy, the Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals discussed, with respect to this type of stock-for-stock transaction, 
whether the sellers of the target company were to be considered “purchasers” entitled to 
protection of Ohio’s Blue Sky Law.  498 F.3d at 391; see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.43 
(West, Westlaw through 2008 File 129 of the 127th Gen. Assembly). 
Gruzs: Responding to an Unforeseen Variation: Why Ohio Should Provide a
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2008
308 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43 
the federal court must interpret the state securities claims as the state 
court would, B and Z should expect similar treatment of their state 
securities claims. 
Securities fraud can be perpetrated in a number of ways.3  Based on 
the plain language of Ohio Revised Code section 1707.43, the right of 
rescission is limited to defrauded purchasers of securities.4  The statute 
is, however, silent as to relief for parties in a stock-for-stock exchange in 
which there is no clearly defined “purchaser” or “seller.”5  Construing 
the statute as written, it is possible for a court to confront the situation of 
either denying statutory relief to a party that is not a “purchaser,” or to 
use a perilous, result-based approach to categorize the parties so that 
they fit the language of the statute.6  This Note posits that this approach 
of the courts is not needed.  The necessity of statutory interpretation, 
illustrated by inconsistent judicial reasoning, signals a need for change.7 
Part II of this Note discusses the development of state Blue Sky Law, 
and how the debate surrounding uniformity—both between states, and 
also between state and federal regulatory agencies—has affected the 
current configuration of securities fraud regulation.8  It concludes with 
                                                 
3 See “Securities Fraud Lawsuit” http://www.onlinelawyersource.com/stock_fraud/ 
securities-Lawuit.html (last visited on Aug. 19, 2008).  Investors of securities who have 
been harmed have the option of filing a securities fraud lawsuit.  Id.  The typical securities 
fraud lawsuit is filed against “[s]ecurities brokers, dealers, financial advisors, securities 
corporations, shareholders, and private investors . . . .” found to be responsible for fraud.  
Id.  There are four common types of fraud committed by stockbrokers and investment 
advisors:  churning (when a broker engages in “excessive transactions for the purpose of 
generating commissions . . . for his own benefit rather than the benefit of the client[]”); 
unsuitability (when a broker breaches his duty by making investments that are inconsistent 
with the client’s “risk tolerance, needs and investment objectives[]”; over-concentration 
(when a broker “puts too much of . . . [the client’s] portfolio in an individual investment 
(such as the stock of a particular company) or type of investment (such as pharmaceutical 
stocks)[]”); and misrepresentation/non-disclosure (when a broker “provides false or 
misleading information to a client regarding an investment.”).  “Types of Securities Fraud” 
http://www.securities-fraud-attorneys.com/securities-fraud-types.htm (last visited Aug. 
19, 2008).  This Note focuses on misrepresentation and non-disclosure—specifically in the 
instance of a stock-for-stock exchange. 
4 § 1707.43(A).  With respect to the right of rescission, “every sale or contract for sale 
made in violation of Chapter 1707. of the Revised Code, is voidable at the election of the 
purchaser.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
5 § 1707.43. 
6 See infra Part III.B (discussing how the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted 
broadly the plain meaning of section 1707.43 when providing the statutory right of 
rescission to a target corporation acquired by means of a stock-for-stock exchange). 
7 See infra Part IV (explaining how the author’s proposed statutory amendments to 
section 1707.43 will provide a workable alternative to inconsistent judicial interpretation 
caused by overly narrow construction of the statutory language). 
8 See infra Parts II.A–B (exploring the development of state securities regulation, and 
specifically Congress’s pro-uniformity legislation enacted to combat the lack of uniformity 
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how a recent Sixth Circuit decision supports the argument for a 
consistent, uniform application of state securities fraud regulation 
statutes.9  Part III then addresses the effects of Congress’s decision to 
grant fraud regulation to the states, and how the narrow scope of Ohio’s 
Blue Sky Law provides an excellent example of how the dual regulatory 
system allows for a statutory ambiguity as to who should receive the 
protection of the Blue Sky Law.10  Part IV proposes an amendment to 
section 1707.43 of Ohio’s Blue Sky Law to be used in determining which 
parties should be provided the right of rescission when defrauded by 
another party.11 
II.  BACKGROUND 
It will be observed, therefore, that the law is a regulation of business, 
constrains conduct only to that end, the purpose being to protect the public 
against the imposition of unsubstantial schemes and the securities based upon 
them.  Whatever prohibition there is, is a means to the same purpose, made 
necessary, it may be supposed, by the persistence of evil and its insidious forms 
and the experience of the inadequacy of penalties or other repressive measures.  
The name that is given to the law indicates the evil at which it is 
aimed . . . “speculative schemes which have no more basis than so many feet of 
‘blue sky[] . . . .’”12 
 
To understand who should be entitled to the statutory right of 
rescission under Ohio’s Blue Sky Law, it is necessary to explore the 
broad and jagged landscape in which Ohio’s state securities regulations 
operate.  Part II.A of this Note focuses on the development of state Blue 
Sky Law against the backdrop of increased federal securities 
regulation.13  Next, Part II.B examines the effects of the National 
Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 (“NSMIA”) on states’ 
                                                                                                             
among state securities regulation statutes that caused substantial hardship and confusion 
when attempting to comply with multiple, often inconsistent, statutes). 
9 See infra Part II.C.3 (describing the interpretation of section 1707.43 by the Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals, and how this broad statutory interpretation was needed to account for a 
transaction that fell outside the purview of the statutory language). 
10 See infra Part III (analyzing how the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Murphy 
construed the explicit language of section 1707.43 broadly, showing the need for clear, 
consistent interpretation and application of Ohio’s antifraud provisions). 
11 See infra Part IV (suggesting an expansion of the applicability of the right of rescission 
from only purchasers to all parties acquiring securities by means of an exchange of 
securities). 
12 Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 550 (1917). 
13 See infra Part II.A (discussing the development state Blue Sky Law leading up to the 
Uniform Securities Act of 1956). 
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retention of jurisdiction in fraud actions.14  Last, Part II.C discusses Ohio 
Blue Sky Law’s antifraud provisions, specifically how the recent Sixth 
Circuit decision in Murphy v. Stargate Defense Systems Corp.15 supports 
consistent legislation and interpretation of state Blue Sky Law 
remedies.16  As a result of Murphy, the critical issue remains whether 
both parties in a stock-for-stock exchange are afforded the remedies 
currently available under Ohio Blue Sky Law.17 
A. Uniform Securities Act of 1956:  An Initial Approach to Uniformity 
The argument for uniformity among state securities has been fertile 
ground for substantial scholarship and debate.18  Although states have 
                                                 
14 See infra Part II.B (discussing why Congress enacted the National Securities Market 
Improvement Act of 1996 as a reaction to a lack of uniformity in the dual regulatory system 
of securities regulation). 
15 498 F.3d 386 (6th Cir. 2007). 
16 See infra Part II.C (discussing Ohio’s antifraud provisions, remedies available to 
buyers, and how Murphy raises the issue of interpreting which parties to a stock-for-stock 
exchange are afforded these remedies). 
17 See infra Part III.B. 
18 LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION VOL. 1 41–49 (3d ed. 1989) 
(noting how, before the development of federal regulatory authorities, actors involved in 
interstate securities business sought consistent, uniform regulation from state to state); see 
Kenneth I. Denos, Blue and Gray Skies:  The National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 
1996 Makes the Case for Uniformity in State Securities Law, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 101, 105 (1997) 
(discussing how the NSMIA’s preemption of state securities law is a step towards 
uniformity, but because of the “duality of the American judicial system[,]” inconsistency 
still remains among the states regarding authority to combat fraud); Hoffman, supra note 1, 
at 108 (“The most difficult aspect of Blue Sky work is the lack of uniformity of the statutes, 
both as to substantive and procedural matters.”); T. W. Dahlquist, Regulation and Civil 
Liability Under the California Corporate Securities Act: II, 34 CAL. L. REV. 344, 393 (1946) 
(promoting uniformity among states because of the “stupendous, tedious and wasteful task 
involved[]” in analyzing all state Blue Sky Law when attempting to ensure that a security 
issue is in compliance with all applicable state statutes); see also Francis J. Facciolo & 
Richard L. Stone, Avoiding the Inevitable:  The Continuing Viability of State Law Claims in the 
Face of Primary Jurisdiction and Preemption Challenges Under The Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, 1995 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 525, 619 n.294 (1995) (discussing the appropriateness of 
considering federal securities law concepts when construing Blue Sky statutory provisions 
that are similar to the federal provisions); Martin C. McWilliams, Jr., Thoughts on Borrowing 
Federal Securities Jurisprudence under the Uniform Securities Act, 38 S.C. L. REV. 243 (1987) 
(discussing the benefits of maintaining uniformity between state and federal law, although 
cautioning that this pursuit should not serve as a catch-all trump to the unique interests of 
each state).  But see LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra, at 58 (quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 
285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).  “It is one of the happy incidents of the 
federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a 
laboratory[] and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the 
country.”  Id.  The authors, commenting on Justice Brandeis’s admonition of the Court’s 
willingness to embrace notions of uniformity, comment that “[a]s a matter of principle, it is 
difficult to justify the federal government’s telling the states that they cannot try to protect 
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promulgated their own securities regulations, those states that have done 
so have legislated against the backdrop of federal securities regulation.19  
But even before the enactment of the first federal securities regulation in 
the 1930s, a few states had already begun to adopt their own securities 
regulations.20 
Kansas is credited with passing the first state securities law in 1911.21  
Motivated by the populist philosophy prevalent throughout the 
Midwest, the Kansas Securities Act required registration of both 
securities and securities salesmen.22  Between 1914 and 1916, despite this 
                                                                                                             
their citizens beyond the federal disclosure philosophy.”  Id.  As the authors point out, 
however, many who make this argument do not extend its application beyond disclosure 
regulations.  Id. 
19 See Denos, supra note 18, at 105 (1997) (describing the following major sources of 
federal securities legislation:  The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (1933) 
(regulating public offerings of securities, prohibiting offers and sales of unregistered 
securities, and prohibiting fraudulent practices in any offer or sale of securities); and The 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78lll (1934) (established the Securities 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”) and extended federal regulation to trading in securities 
already issued, in addition to many other provisions not critical to analysis in this Note).  
See also Manning Gilbert Warren III, Legitimacy in the Securities Industry:  The Role of Merit 
Regulation, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 129, 136–38 (1987).  Warren argues that, despite the difference 
in the scope of regulation, “overlap between the federal and state laws is likely to 
continue.”  Id. at 138.  Even with this overlap, Warren continues, it “serves to fill in the 
cracks where regulatory protection would not otherwise be provided.”  Id.  See also 
Manning Gilbert Warren III, Reflections on Dual Regulation of Securities:  A Case Against 
Preemption, 25 B.C. L. REV. 495 (1984) (defending the dual system of regulation, and 
generally arguing against federal preemption of state regulation). 
20 See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 29–41.  The earliest, rudimentary statutes 
sprung up in Massachusetts, California, Georgia, Missouri, Connecticut, Nevada, and 
Rhode Island.  Id. at 29–35.  For example, the 1904 Georgia statute required 
[C]ompanies selling “investment securities of any kind on the partial 
payment, installment or any other plan of payment, and providing for 
the redemption and retiring of the same, or any part thereof,” to 
deposit in a trust company at least $25,000, to establish a redemption 
fund of at least 75 percent of that amount collected in premiums, and 
to file annual financial statements with the Comptroller General. 
Id. at 30 (quoting 1904 Ga. Laws No. 592 at 74). 
21 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 32. 
22 See id. at 34. The Kansas Act provided: 
[I]f said bank commissioner finds that such articles of incorporation or 
association, charter, constitution and by-laws, plan of business or 
proposed contract, contain any provision that is unfair, unjust, 
inequitable or oppressive to any class of contributors, or if he decides 
from his examination of its affairs that said investment company is not 
solvent and does not intend to do a fair and honest business, and in his 
judgment does not promise a fair return on the stocks, bonds, or other 
securities by it offered for sale, then he shall notify such investment 
company in writing of his findings, and it shall be unlawful for such 
company to do any further business in this state. . . .  
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initial populist surge in favor of state regulation, federal district courts 
were quite reluctant to uphold state securities statutes due to claims that 
state regulation was unduly burdensome on interstate commerce.23  In 
1917, however, the Supreme Court reversed course and upheld the Ohio, 
South Dakota, and Michigan state statutes in the notorious “Blue Sky 
Cases.”24  Now, more than 90 years later, each state and territory has 
promulgated state securities regulation.25  Although there is a variety of 
state statutes, many, if not most, are based on the Uniform Securities Act 
of 1956.26 
1. The Uniform Securities Act of 1956—Background, Development, and 
Influence 
Prior to the Uniform Securities Act of 1956,27 Blue Sky Law varied 
drastically from state to state.28  In fact, there were no identical acts prior 
to 1956, and “the amount of variation and frequently unnecessary 
complexity in both substance and verbiage [was] staggering.”29  But in 
                                                                                                             
Id. at 34–35 n.22 (quoting 1911 Kansas Law ch. 133, § 5).  Under the Kansas Act, fraudulent 
activities were grounds for appointment of a receiver, and also were criminalized.  Id. at 35 
n.23.  Within the first 18 months of enacting the statute, a large portion of the companies 
that had been investigated had received permits.  Id. 
23 See generally LOUIS LOSS & EDWARD M. COWETT, BLUE SKY LAW 10 (1958), for a 
discussion of the following cases in which the Iowa, Ohio, South Dakota, West Virginia, 
and successive regulatory acts in Michigan were found to be in conflict with the federal 
Constitution:  Wm. R. Compton Co. v. Allen, 216 Fed. 537 (S.D. Iowa 1914); Geiger-Jones v. 
Turner, 230 Fed. 233 (S.D. Ohio 1916); Sioux Falls Stock Yards Co. v. Caldwell, (D. S.D. 
1915); Bracey v. Darst, 218 Fed. 482 (N.D. W. Va. 1914); Alabama & New Orleans Transp. 
Co. v. Doyle, 210 Fed. 173 (E.D. Mich. 1914); N. W. Halsey & Co. v. Merrick, 228 Fed. 805 
(E.D. Mich. 1915). 
24 Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 (1917); Caldwell v. Sioux Falls Stock Yards Co., 
242 U.S. 559 (1917); Merrick v. N.W. Halsey & Co., 242 U.S. 568 (1917) (in each of these 
three cases, the Supreme Court upheld the state Blue Sky statutes as neither violative of the 
Fourteenth Amendment nor unduly burdensome of interstate commerce). 
25 50 State Statutory Surveys:  Blue Sky Laws Securities Transactions (2007 Westlaw 
50StateSurveysdatabase; then type “Surveys Offer Sale”) (reviewing State Blue Sky laws, 
specifically the applicability of the regulations). 
26 See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 66 n.89.  There are 39 Uniform Securities Act 
jurisdictions, and most have adopted section 101, the antifraud provision.  Id. 
27 UNIF. SECURITIES ACT 7A U.L.A. 568 (1958), reprinted in LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 
18, at 50–79. 
28 See LOSS & COWETT, supra note 23, at 231 (noting how “a number of legislatures and 
administrators have moved ahead independently in different ways[]”). 
29 Id. at 18–19; see Hoffman, supra note 1, at 108. 
The most difficult aspect of Blue Sky work is the lack of uniformity of 
the statutes, both as to substantive and procedural matters.  This 
problem is further complicated by wide variations in administration, 
not only from state to state, but sometimes from case to case in a single 
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1956, the North American Securities Administrators Association 
(“NASAA”) addressed this issue.30  NASAA promulgated the final draft 
of the Uniform Securities Act after nearly 10 years of structuring “a new 
uniform or model State Sale of Securities Act . . . to the end that the 
existing diversity of legal requirements preliminary to the issuance of 
securities be minimized to the greatest possible extent.”31  In 1978, the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law sought a 
revision of the 1956 Uniform Securities Act.32  But due to significant 
disagreements arising out of the 1978 revision, the Conference began to 
undertake a completely new draft in 1983.33  This new draft, the 1985 
Uniform Securities Act,34 was not met with the same approval as its 
predecessor in 1956.35  As a result, the 1956 Act has retained influence 
                                                                                                             
state.  However in recent years, several steps have been taken to 
improve this situation. 
Id.  Hoffman notes that much has been done to improve the variation and complexity that 
existed prior to the Uniform Securities Act of 1956.  Id. 
30 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 46 (citing 72 ABA REP. 98, 297 (1947)).  After the 
1956 promulgation, the Act was approved by the American Bar Association and the North 
American Securities Administrators, and endorsed by the SEC.  Id. at 47–48.  The Chairman 
of the SEC had the following to say in support of the new Act: 
I have been authorized to advise you that the Commissioners 
unanimously concur in the principle of uniformity of laws among the 
states with respect to the control of securities markets.  With this 
principle in mind, the Commission has unanimously endorsed the 
proposed legislation.  It is hoped that its enactment by the states will 
bring about a better integration of the work of state securities 
administrators with the work of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission. 
Id. at 48 n.54. 
31 Id. at 46 (citing 72 ABA REP. 98, 297 (1947)).  See McWilliams, supra note 18, at 253 n.53 
and accompanying text.  McWilliams cites the standard policy provision of the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law as follows: 
This Act shall be so construed as to effectuate its general purpose to 
make uniform the law of those states which enact it and to coordinate 
the interpretation and administration of this act with the related 
federal regulation. 
Id.  Additionally, McWilliams points out that courts interpreting the Uniform Securities Act 
have given weight to this purpose statement.  Id.; see, e.g., Kansas State Bank v. Citizens 
Bank, 737 F.2d 1490, 1496 (8th Cir. 1984) (looking to the standard policy provision of the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law when construing a provision 
of the Kansas Act, which does not contain such a clear statement of purpose). 
32 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 48. 
33 Id. 
34 Id., at 48. 
35 Id. at 49.  Although the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law 
approved the 1985 Uniform Act, it did not receive the same approval from the ABA.  Id.; see 
also Mark Sargent, Blue Sky Law:  Some Thoughts on the Revised Uniform Securities Act, 14 SEC. 
REG. L.J 62 (1986).  Sargent notes that the Revised Uniform Securities Act was “not intended 
to produce a radical transformation of blue sky law.”  Id. at 64.  Nevertheless, according to 
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over the states’ legislation, illustrated by the fact that a majority of 
jurisdictions that adopted the Act’s provisions did not do the same with 
the 1985 Act.36  Key aspects of the 1985 Act left unenacted by the states 
were the antifraud provisions.37 
2. Key Antifraud Provisions of the 1956 Act 
It must be noted first that the Uniform Securities Act of 1956 is 
divided into four parts, as follows:  Part I deals with fraudulent and 
other prohibited practices; Part II concerns registration of broker-dealers, 
agents, and investment advisers; Part III encompasses registration of 
securities; and Part IV includes general provisions, including 
definitions.38  Each part is constructed so that it may stand alone.39  
Indeed, the Act provided flexibility for states that chose to adopt only 
certain provisions.40 
Part I, “Fradulent and Other Prohibited Practices,” contains two 
sections:  section 101 outlaws fraudulent practices in connection with the 
sale or purchase of a security; and section 102 concerns fraudulent and 
other undesirable investment advisory activities.41  The language of 
section 101 is as follows: 
It is unlawful for any person, in connection with the offer, 
sale or purchase of any security, directly or indirectly 
(1)  to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to 
defraud, (2) to make any untrue statement of a 
material fact or to omit to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in 
the light of the circumstances under which they are 
                                                                                                             
Sargent, the Revised Uniform Securities Act can serve as a collection of new ideas that may 
potentially “lay the foundation for some future resynthesis.”  Id. at 74. 
36 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 48. 
37 See infra Part II.A.2. 
38 See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 51–60, for a more thorough analysis of these 
four parts of the Uniform Securities Act of 1956.  This note focuses on an analysis of Part I 
of the Uniform Securities Act. 
39 Id. at 50.  The Act was so construed based upon the theory that “it was impractical to 
expect complete uniformity among states with basically different regulatory philosophies, 
but that there was some likelihood of achieving a substantial degree of uniformity among 
those states that followed a particular philosophy.”  Id.  As a result, a state that wanted to 
adopt, for example, the fraud provisions, was able to do so without adopting any other 
sections, in part or in whole.  Id.  See id. at 171–225 for a more in-depth discussion of 
regulatory philosophies. 
40 See id. at 50–51. 
41 UNIF. SECURITIES ACT §§ 101–02, 7A U.L.A. 568 (1958), reprinted in LOSS & SELIGMAN, 
supra note 18, at  62–63 n.83. 
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made, not misleading, or (3) to engage in any act, 
practice, or course of business which operates or 
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any 
person.42 
Working in conjunction with the antifraud provisions of section 101 
are the provisions setting forth sanctions for unlawful conduct.43  
Sections 409 and 410 establish criminal and civil liability, respectively, 
for violations of section 101.44  Most critical to this Note’s ultimate 
                                                 
42 UNIF. SECURITIES ACT § 101, 7A U.L.A. 568 (1958) (emphasis added), reprinted in LOSS 
& SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 62 (emphasis added).   The language of section 101 is 
modeled after Federal Rule 10b-5 adopted under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and 
on Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933.  See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 62.  
The language of Rule 10b-5, is as follows: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of 
any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or 
of any facility of any national securities exchange, 
(a)  To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to 
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements 
made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were 
made, not misleading, or 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which 
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, 
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2004).  Section 17(a) of the Securities Act is as follows: 
(a)  Use of interstate commerce for purpose of fraud or deceit 
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities 
or any security-based swap agreement (as defined in section 206B of 
the Gramm-Leach Bliley Act) by the use of any means or instruments 
of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or by use 
of the mails, directly or indirectly 
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or  
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue 
statement of a material fact or any omission to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; or  
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business 
which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the 
purchaser. 
15 U.S.C. § 77q (2000).  It is worth noting that the language of section 501 of the 2002 
Uniform Securities Act is identical to the language of section 101 of the 1956 Act.  See JOEL 
SELIGMAN, THE NEW UNIFORM SECURITIES ACT (2003) for discussion and analysis of the 
most current proposed state securities legislation.  For purposes of this Note, however, the 
focus is limited to the influence of the 1956 Act because it is the most widely adopted 
version of the Act; see infra note 51. 
43 See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 63 nn.83–87 (discussing sanctions for unlawful 
conduct in the 1956 Act, as well as similar provisions in the 1985 Revised Act). 
44 UNIF. SECURITIES ACT §§ 409–10, 7A U.L.A. 568 (1958), reprinted in LOSS & SELIGMAN, 
supra note 18, at 64–65.  Section 409 provides criminal penalties for willful violations of any 
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analysis, however, is section 410.45  The protection of section 410 is 
limited to “buyers” of securities.46  As a protected entity, a buyer is 
permitted under section 410(a) to 
[S]ue either at law or in equity to recover the 
consideration paid for the security, together with 
interest at six per cent per year from the date of 
payment, costs, and reasonable attorneys’ fees, less the 
amount of any income received on the security, upon the 
tender of the security, or for damages if he no longer 
owns the security.47 
Indeed, section 410 provides only buyers of securities with statutory 
relief in an action for fraud.48  The Uniform Securities Act of 1956 is silent 
regarding defrauded sellers.49 
Based on this analysis and historical background of select provisions 
of the Uniform Securities Act of 1956, it is clear that states, in 
promulgating Blue Sky securities legislation, have been encouraged to 
                                                                                                             
provision of the Act.  Id.  Similarly, section 407(a) authorizes the securities administrator to 
make public or private investigations of violations of the act, section 407(b) provides for 
enforcement of court-ordered subpoenas, and section 408 authorizes the securities 
administrator to seek an injunction from an appropriate court to enjoin violations of the 
Act.  Id. 
45 See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing the rescission provision of OHIO R.C. § 1707.43 that is 
explicitly limited to purchasers). 
46 See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 65 (quoting UNIF. SECURITIES ACT § 101, 7A 
U.L.A. 568 (1958), Draftsman’s Commentary) (discussing the limitation to buyers as 
appropriate in light of “the common-law and equitable remedies of deceit and rescission 
which are available to the state courts without benefit of statute[]”). 
47 UNIF. SECURITIES ACT §§ 410(a), 7A U.L.A. 568 (1958), reprinted in LOSS & SELIGMAN, 
supra note 18, at 65.  In addition, section 410(b) defines who is liable: 
Every person who directly or indirectly controls a seller liable under 
subsection (a), every partner, officer, or director of such a seller, every 
person occupying a similar status or performing similar functions, 
every employee of such a seller[,] . . . and every broker-dealer or agent 
who materially aids in the sale are also liable jointly and severally with 
and to the same extent as the seller, unless the non-seller who is so 
liable sustains the burden of proof that he did not know, and in 
exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of the existence of 
the facts by reason of which liability is alleged to exist.  There is 
contribution as in cases of contract among the several persons so liable. 
UNIF. SECURITIES ACT §§ 410(b), 7A U.L.A. 568 (1958), reprinted in LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra 
note 18, at 65. 
48 UNIF. SECURITIES ACT § 410(a), 7A U.L.A. 568 (1958), reprinted in LOSS & SELIGMAN, 
supra note 18, at 65; see LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 65 (quoting UNIF. SECURITIES ACT 
§ 101, 7A U.L.A. 568 (1958), Draftsman’s Commentary). 
49 See generally UNIF. SECURITIES ACT 7A U.L.A. 568 (1958), reprinted in LOSS & SELIGMAN, 
supra note 18, at 50–79. 
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embrace uniformity.50  Among the 39 Uniform Securities Act 
jurisdictions, 34 have adopted section 101.51  Additionally, four non-
Uniform Securities Act jurisdictions have done likewise.52  Although it 
has not been unanimously adopted by the states, the Uniform Securities 
Act of 1956 has experienced some success in promoting uniformity from 
                                                 
50 See supra Part II.A. 
51 ALA. CODE § 8-6-17 (West, Westlaw through 2008 Reg. and First Spec. Sess.); ALASKA 
STAT. § 45.55.010 (West, Westlaw through 2008 Sec. Reg. Sess.); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-42-507 
(West, Westlaw through 2008 First Ex. Sess.); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 36b-4 (West, Westlaw 
through 2008 Feb. Reg. Sess.); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 7303 (West, Westlaw through 76 
Laws 2008, ch. 416); D.C. CODE § 31-5605.02 (West, Westlaw through July 7, 2008); IDAHO 
CODE ANN. § 30-14-501 (West, Westlaw through 2008 Sec. Reg. Sess.); IND. CODE § 23-19-5-1 
(West, Westlaw through 2008 Sec. Reg. Sess.); IOWA CODE § 502.501 (West, Westlaw 
through 2008 Reg. Sess.); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-12a501 (West, Westlaw through 2007 Reg. 
Sess.); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 292.320 (West, Westlaw through 2007); MD. CODE ANN., 
CORPS. & ASS’NS § 11-301 (West, Westlaw through 2008 Reg. Sess.); MASS. GEN. LAW ch. 
110A, § 101 (West, Westlaw through 2008 Sec. Annual Sess.); MICH. COMP. LAW § 451.501 
(West, Westlaw through P.A. 2008, No. 267 of the 2008 Reg. Sess.); MISS. CODE. ANN. § 75-
71-501 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 557 of the 2008 Reg. Sess.); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-10-
301 (West, Westlaw through the End of 2007 Reg. Sess. and May 2007 Spec. Sess.); NEB REV. 
STAT. § 8-1102 (West, Westlaw through 2007 First Reg. Sess.); NEV. REV. STAT. § 90.570 
(West, Westlaw through 2007 Reg. Sess. and Spec. Sess.); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421-B:5 
(West, Westlaw through Ch. 236 of the 2008 Reg. Sess.); N.M. STAT. § 58-13B-30 (West, 
Westlaw through 2008 Sec. Reg. Sess.); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78A-8 (West, Westlaw through 
S.L. 2008-23 of the 2008 Reg. Sess.); OKLA. STAT. tit. 71, § 1-501 (West, Westlaw through 2008 
Sec. Reg. Sess.); OR. REV. STAT. § 59.055, 135, 335, 345, 365 (West, Westlaw through 2007 Reg. 
Sess.); 70 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1-401 (West, Westlaw through Act 2008-18); S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 35-1-501 (West, Westlaw through 2007 Reg. Sess.); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-2-121 
(West, Westlaw through 2008 Sec. Reg. Sess.); UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-1-1 (West, Westlaw 
through 2008 Gen Sess.); VA. CODE. ANN. § 13.1-502 (West, Westlaw through 2008 Spec. 
Sess. I and II; WASH REV. CODE § 21.20.010 (West, Westlaw through 2008); W. VA. CODE 
§ 32-1-101 (West, Westlaw through 2008 Sec. Ext. Sess.); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-4-101 (West, 
Westlaw through 2008 Budget Sess.); GUAM CODE ANN. tit. 22, § 46101 (West, Westlaw 
through P.L. 29-0003 (2007)); P.R. LAW ANN. tit. 10, § 851 (West, Westlaw through 2005). 
52 See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 66–67, for a discussion of those jurisdictions 
considered to be Uniform Securities Act jurisdictions.  Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Texas, 
and Vermont are non-Uniform Securities Act jurisdictions, but they have enacted securities 
fraud provisions similar to § 101 of the 1956 Act.  See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 67 
n.91.  Ohio, which is not a Uniform Securities Act jurisdiction, has enacted OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 1707.01(J) (West, Westlaw through 2008 File 129 of the 127th Gen. Assembly), 
expanding on the language of § 101, defining “fraud” as: 
anything recognized on or after July 22, 1929, as such in courts of law 
or equity; any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud or to obtain money 
or property by means of any false pretense, representation, or promise; 
any fictitious or pretended purchase or sale of securities; and any act, 
practice, transaction, or course of business relating to the sale of 
securities that is fraudulent or that has operated or would operate as a 
fraud upon the seller or purchaser. 
Id.; see infra note 80 and accompanying text. 
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state to state, at least with regard to antifraud provisions of the various 
states’ Blue Sky Law.53 
B. The National Securities Market Improvement Act of 1996:  A Call for 
Uniformity? 
Notwithstanding the positive impact of the Uniform Securities Act of 
1956 on encouraging uniformity among states, the dual regulatory 
system of securities regulation that encompassed both state and federal 
regulation impeded investors, issuers, and regulators alike with 
significant obstacles.54  Despite the challenges inherent in complying 
with many different statutes in the case of a national securities offering, 
for example, states have nevertheless continued to maintain a strong 
interest in preserving their Blue Sky Law.55  Thus, it was within this 
                                                 
53 See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 66–67. 
54 See Denos, supra note 18, at 102.  Denos discusses how many state provisions are “at 
odds with comparable provisions at the federal level, . . . .” and also how those wishing to 
comply with both sets of provisions are faced with multiple “layer[s] of red tape[.]”  Id. 
(footnote omitted).  Additionally, Denos mentions the problem that arises when issuers 
seek to comply with provisions of multiple states in a single securities offering.  Id.  
Ultimately, Denos contends that Congress’s intervention vis-à-vis the NSMIA was a 
preemptive measure in favor of a single regulatory structure.  See also Therese H. Maynard, 
The Uniform Limited Offering Exemption:  How “Uniform” is “Uniform”?—An Evaluation and 
Critique of the ULOE, 36 EMORY L.J. 357, 359 (1987) (“The logistics and expense of 
[complying with both sets of laws] can become so substantial that many small issuers 
ultimately abandon or significantly scale back their efforts to obtain additional capital.”); 
Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr., Jr., An Open Attack on the Nonsense of  Regulation, 10 J. CORP. L. 
553 (1985) [hereinafter Campbell Jr., An Open Attack] (noting generally the challenges of 
complying with various state Blue Sky Laws). 
55 See Mark A. Sargent, A Future for Blue Sky Law, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 471, 498–99 (1993) 
[hereinafter Sargent, A Future for Blue Sky Law]. Sargent points out the interests of two 
primary players in the state securities regulation arena:  state regulators and state 
governments.  Id.  He notes that state regulators and administrators “tend to regard 
themselves as unusually committed to speaking for investors who cannot speak for 
themselves.”  Id. at 498.  Pitted against this ideological motivation of state regulators and 
administrators is what Sargent terms rather cynically the “cash cow[]” motivation.  Id. at 
499.  Next, Sargent examines the “cash-starved state governments [who] are not likely to 
surrender such a profitable source of revenues easily[]” as the second key example of the 
states’ interest in maintaining securities regulation.  Id.  Thus, Sargent posits that the states 
have a “deep[]” interest in Blue Sky Law that is rooted in revenue, but the specifics of the 
interest, according to Sargent, is a matter of indifference to state governments.  Id.; see also 
Mark A. Sargent, The National Securities Markets Improvements Act—One Year Later.  
Introduction, 53 BUS. LAW. 507 (1998) [hereinafter Sargent, NSMIA] (noting the concern, on 
behalf of state regulators upon learning of early drafts of the NSMIA legislation, that 
traditional state regulation would be eradicated in favor of uniform SEC regulation). 
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complex framework of securities regulations that the regulatory 
structure received a major overhaul in 1996.56 
The National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 
(“NSMIA”) delegated exclusively to the SEC regulation of certain 
activities related to the offering, promotion, and sale of nationally traded 
securities.57  Most important for this Note’s analysis, however, is the 
section of the NSMIA that did not delegate exclusive regulatory control 
to the SEC; section 102(a) preserved the states’ power to prosecute fraud: 
Consistent with this section, the securities commission 
(or any agency or officer performing like functions) of 
any State shall retain jurisdiction under the laws of such 
State to investigate and bring enforcement actions with 
respect to fraud or deceit, or unlawful conduct by a 
broker or dealer, in connection with securities or 
securities transactions.58  
                                                 
56 See, e.g., JAMES HAMILTON, SECURITIES REFORM:  NATIONAL SECURITIES MARKETS 
IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1996 LAW & EXPLANATION 9–13 (1999) (lamenting the complexities of 
the dual regulatory structure as requiring excessive costs in arranging a nationwide 
securities offering). 
57 See The National Securities Markets Improvement Act (“NSMIA”), §§ 102–103, 15 
U.S.C. § 77r (2000).  By delegating certain responsibilities to the SEC, Congress exempted 
areas for state control.  Id.  For example, in the area of broker-dealer regulation, the NSMIA 
provides an exemption from state regulation for “de minimus transactions;” additionally, 
the NSMIA declares securities issued by mutual funds under the exclusive control of SEC 
regulation; finally, the SEC retains exclusive control of supervising investment advisors 
who manage over $25 million; see also Denos, supra note 18, at 131 (describing the drastic 
changes the NSMIA made in allocating the regulatory power between the SEC and the 
states). 
58 NSMIA § 102(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77r(c)(1) (2000).  Despite the NSMIA’s profound impact 
on the state-federal regulatory dynamic, however, it surely “fell short of a fundamental 
reordering of the state-federal system of securities regulation and it certainly did not put 
finis to almost a century of blue sky law.”  Sargent, NSMIA, supra note 55, at 507.  Thus, 
although “[t]he scope and weight of blue sky law has changed in important respects . . . the 
state regulatory powers remain important.”  Id. at 507–08; see Rutheford B Campbell, Jr., 
Blue Sky Laws and the Recent Congressional Preemption Failure, 22 J. CORP. L. 175, 203 (1997) 
[hereinafter Campbell Jr., Recent Congressional Preemption] (positing that the changes 
effected by the NSMIA are generally insignificant.).  See also Campbell, Jr., An Open Attack, 
supra note 54.  Campbell, Jr. argues that even “state antifraud provisions should be 
preempted in favor of federal antifraud provisions[.] . . . .”  Id. at 575 (footnote omitted).  
His argument is based on the premise that section 101 of the Uniform Securities Act of 1956  
is substantially the same as Rule 10b-5 promulgated under the 1934 Securities Act.  Id. at 
576.  Campbell, Jr. provides two reasons supporting preemption: 
First, the state antifraud rules are fundamentally the same as the 
federal antifraud rules[] . . . .  As a result, compliance with federal 
standards normally insures [sic] that an issuer is in compliance with 
state standards[] . . . .  Second, compliance with state antifraud 
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By enacting the NSMIA, Congress sought to clarify the responsibilities of 
the SEC and the state regulatory agencies with the twin aims of 
enhancing investor protection and reducing the costs of investing.59 
Retaining the power to regulate fraud, states have considerable 
leeway in the construction of their antifraud provisions.60  For example, 
state civil liability statutes predicate antifraud recovery on various levels 
of culpability, ranging from simple negligence61 to recklessness or 
intent.62  However, this power in the hands of the state could prove 
counter-productive to some of the preemptive effects of the NSMIA.63  
Consequently, the state power, as a result of the NSMIA’s incomplete 
preemption, has the potential to deliver a “severe blow to the uniformity 
that is the policy basis for preemption.”64 
These concerns aside, the NSMIA had a monumental impact on the 
regulatory dynamic, even if the states did retain the power to enact their 
own antifraud legislation.65  It was clear that the intent of Congress—in 
essentially preempting the states’ Blue Sky Law (except for antifraud 
legislation)—was to promote uniformity among the states.66  But in 
allowing the states to retain antifraud jurisdiction, Congress appeared to 
                                                                                                             
provisions does not require any filing or administrative approval as a 
prerequisite to the completion of a proposed transaction. 
Id.  Campbell, Jr.’s argument is based on states’ duplication of the federal standards.  Id.  
He does, however, discuss the (unlikely) possibility that the states could define their 
provisions differently from the federal provisions, but he views this only as further support 
of his argument in favor of preemption of state antifraud provisions.  Id.  Campbell, Jr. 
concludes that total preemption is the obvious alternative when many states merely mimic 
the federal regulations, and when variations do nothing but generate costs in excess of any 
societal benefit.  Id.; see supra note 42 and accompanying text (comparing the language of 
section 101 of the Uniform Securities Act of 1956 with the language of Rule 10b-5).  But see 
Sargent, A Future for Blue Sky Law, supra note 55, at 498–99 (providing states’ motivations 
for maintaining Blue Sky regulations). 
59 See S. REP. NO. 104–293 (1996); H.R. REP. NO. 104–864, at 39 (1996) (explaining that the 
Act was intended to modernize “our scheme of securities regulation to promote 
investment, decrease the cost of capital, and encourage competition[] . . . [in response 
to] . . . the system of dual Federal and state securities regulation [that] resulted in a degree 
of duplicative and unnecessary regulation[] . . . [and that] . . . in many instances, is 
redundant, costly, and ineffective.”).  But see Campbell, Jr., Recent Congressional Preemption, 
supra note 58, at 203 (cautioning against optimism that the NSMIA will achieve its goals). 
60 See supra Part II.A.1. 
61 See, e.g., supra note 51 and accompanying text. 
62 See Campbell, Jr., Recent Congressional Preemption, supra note 58, at 201. 
63 Id. 
64 Campbell, Jr., Recent Congressional Preemption, supra note 58, at 201; see Campbell, Jr., 
An Open Attack, supra note 54, at 575–77 (arguing in favor of complete federal preemption 
of state antifraud regulation). 
65 See supra notes 57–58. 
66 See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 1 [2008], Art. 7
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol43/iss1/7
2008] Defrauded Parties in a Stock-for-Stock Exchange 321 
defeat its own supposed goal of uniformity.67  As a result, the effects of 
this incomplete preemption are a lack of uniformity and residual 
confusion within the dual regulatory structure of antifraud regulation 
provisions.68  Even after the NSMIA, antifraud regulation remains 
inconsistent both between the states, as well as between the state and the 
federal regulatory agencies, keeping alive the challenges and resulting 
debates about the dearth of uniformity among state Blue Sky Law. 
C. Development and Interpretation of Remedies for Securities Fraud Under 
Ohio Blue Sky Law 
Following Kansas’s lead in 1911, Ohio enacted Blue Sky securities 
legislation in 1913.69  The 1913 law established a three-part approach to 
regulating securities:  first, the law established a licensing requirement 
for securities dealers; second, the law required registration of the 
securities; and third, the 1913 law established prohibitions and penalties 
for violation of the law.70  And as mentioned above, the United States 
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Ohio’s 1913 law in the 
1917 “Blue Sky Cases.”71 
Notwithstanding the approval of the United States Supreme Court, 
the Ohio law initially received its fair share of criticism.72  Responding to 
such criticism, the 1929 Ohio Securities Act revised the 1913 law.73  After 
this revision, those critical of the 1913 law quickly changed their views.74  
Praising the 1929 Securities Act was one previous dissenter, a satisfied, 
contemporary businessman, who suggested that the new law was “a law 
which will not only throw the crooks for a loss but will, at the same time, 
cut away the entangling meshes of red tape and allow legitimate 
                                                 
67 See Campbell, Jr., Recent Congressional Preemption, supra note 58. 
68 See Sargent, NSMIA, supra note 55. 
69 See Thomas E. Geyer, Viewing the Columbus Skyline:  Incorporating Federal Law into the 
Anti-Fraud Standard of the Ohio Securities Act, 28 U. TOL. L. REV. 301, 303 (1996).  Geyer cites 
the 1926 decision The Warren People’s Market Co. v. Corbett & Sons for the notion that the 
legislators in 1913 “enacted the Ohio ‘Blue Sky Law’ in 1913 to ‘regulate the sale of bonds, 
stocks, and other securities . . . and to prevent fraud in such sales.”  Id. (quoting The 
Warren People’s Market Co. v. Corbett & Sons, 151 N.E. 51, 55 (Ohio 1926)). 
70 See Geyer, supra note 69, at 303–04. 
71 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
72 See Geyer, supra note 69, at 303.  Criticism was rooted in the typical laissez faire 
arguments launched against government regulation of commerce.  Id. at 304.  Geyer cites 
one unhappy securities practitioner who complained of the statute’s potential to harass 
business.  Id. 
73 See id. at 303.  The 1929 Ohio Securities Act had the effect of essentially repealing the 
entire 1913 code.  Id.  In fact, as Geyer notes, the 1929 Act added almost an entire new 
chapter to the Code.  Id. 
74 See id. 
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business to swoop gracefully down the field for a touchdown.”75  The 
new law stayed true to the original twin aims of investor protection and 
encouragement of capital development by re-working the regulatory 
structure that had served to handcuff both the “crooks” and the 
legitimate securities dealers alike.76  In fact, the 1929 Act was so 
successful that it has remained structurally unchanged by the current 
Ohio Securities Act.77 
1. Ohio’s Interpretation of Fraud 
After the NSMIA’s preemption of much state regulatory power, 
what remains of Ohio’s Blue Sky securities regulations is the power to 
prosecute fraud.78  Even though much state power is preempted by 
federal regulations, preventing exploitation of investors through the sale 
of fraudulent securities remains the primary focus of state regulators—
just as it was at the time of enacting both the 1913 and 1929 Ohio 
Securities Acts.79 
                                                 
75 Id. at 303 (quoting J. C. Little, The New Ohio Securities Act, CLEV. BAR ASS’N J. 5, 5 (Oct. 
1929)). 
76 See supra note 69; see also Geyer, supra note 69, at 305 (discussing capital development). 
77 Geyer, supra note 69, at 305. 
78 See supra Part II.B. 
79 See Geyer, supra note 69, at 301 n.1 (quoting Ohio State Bar Association Corporation 
Law Committee Comments Accompanying the 1929 Amendments to the Ohio Securities 
Act, reprinted in HOWARD FRIEDMAN, OHIO SECURITIES LAW & PRACTICE 23 (Supp. 1994)). 
The proposed act gives to the Division of Securities broadly inclusive 
powers as to fraud . . . .  We believe that this law, as we have drafted it, 
will not unduly restrict the activities of honest men dealing in honest 
securities, and that it will provide the means by which deceptive acts 
can be discovered, prevented and punished. 
Id. (footnote omitted); see also Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 550–51 (1917) 
(upholding the constitutionality of the former Ohio Blue Sky Law in regulating the sale of 
securities).  See also United States v. Tehan, 365 F.2d 191, 194 (6th Cir. 1966).  Upholding a 
prior challenge to the constitutionality of the Ohio Securities Act, the Sixth Circuit 
discussed the reasons for having antifraud provisions in the first place: 
The power of the State to provide for the general welfare authorizes it 
to establish such regulations as will secure or tend to secure the people 
against ignorance often due from an incomplete disclosure of facts by 
one in the unique position to know the facts.  The Ohio Securities Act 
[of 1929], commonly referred to as Ohio Blue Sky Law, was adopted to 
prevent fraudulent exploitations through the sale of securities. 
Id.  See also Bronaugh v. R. & E. Dredging Co., Inc., 242 N.E.2d 572, 576 (Ohio 1968).  
Similarly, the Ohio Supreme Court reiterated the necessities of the antifraud provisions: 
[T]he purpose . . . is to prevent those persons willing to market 
worthless or unnecessarily risky securities from soliciting the 
purchasing public without first subjecting themselves and their 
securities to reasonable licensing and registration requirements 
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Because Ohio is not a Uniform Securities Act jurisdiction, it tends to 
define “fraud” more broadly than the aforementioned Uniform 
Securities Act jurisdictions.80  Coinciding with the NSMIA, in a 1996 case, 
In re Columbus Skyline Securities, Inc.,81 the Ohio Supreme Court had the 
opportunity to interpret the state constitutionality of Ohio’s antifraud 
provision.82  The Columbus Skyline court considered the co-existence of 
                                                                                                             
designed to protect the public from its own stupidity, gullibility and 
avariciousness. 
Id. 
80 OHIO R.C. § 1701.01(J) (West, Westlaw through 2008 File 129 of the 127th Gen. 
Assembly).  The language defining “fraud” is more expansive than the proposed language 
of the Uniform Securities Act of 1956: 
“Fraud,” “fraudulent,” “fraudulent acts,” “fraudulent practices,” or 
“fraudulent transactions” means anything recognized on or after July 
22, 1929, as such in courts of law or equity; any device, scheme, or 
artifice to defraud or to obtain money or property by means of any 
false pretense, representation, or promise; any fictitious or pretended 
purchase or sale of securities; and any act, practice, transaction, or 
course of business relating to the sale of securities that is fraudulent or 
that has operated or would operate as a fraud upon the seller or 
purchaser. 
Id.  To constitute fraud, one must be engaged in selling securities.  State v. Walsh, 420 
N.E.2d 1013, 1017 (Ohio Ct. App. 1979).  The Court in Walsh distinguished an act or practice 
in connection with the sale of the security from an act or practice “subsequent to the sale.”  
Id. (emphasis added).  Additionally, in 1982, the Ohio Court of Appeals determined that 
fraud, for purposes of securities regulation, is not the same as criminal fraud, as defined in 
section 2912.01(K).  State v. Trivedi, 457 N.E.2d 868 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982).  As a result, the 
Court held that restitution was not appropriate.  Id.  But in the 1996 case State v. Clark, the 
same court held that Trivedi had been implicitly overruled by a previous decision, and 
concluded that restitution, in fact, was appropriate.  No. C-960103, 1996 WL 741972 (Ohio 
App. 1 Dist.  Dec. 31, 1996). 
81 Holderman, Comm’r v. Columbus Skyline Sec. (In re Columbus Skyline Sec., Inc.), 660 
N.E.2d 427 (Ohio 1996); see Geyer, supra note 69.  Geyer discusses the significance of the 
Columbus Skyline decision in that few courts have incorporated federal standards into state 
law.  Geyer, supra note 69, at 314.  Additionally, Geyer discusses how this decision confirms 
the states’ retention of power to prosecute fraud, noting, “[i]n reaffirming the dual nature 
of securities regulation, the NSMIA . . . fully sanctions the expansive reach of state 
securities anti-fraud authority.”  Id. at 317.  Geyer concludes his support of the Columbus 
Skyline decision by noting that this incorporation “permits maximum enforcement, uniform 
application and the maintenance of an appropriate balance between investor protection 
and capital formation.”  Id. 
82 Columbus Skyline, 660 N.E.2d at 428–29.  The precise issue here was whether section 
1707.01(J) gives to intrastate securities dealers adequate notice that federal case law may be 
used (to calculate the current market price of over-the-counter stock) to determine if the 
dealer’s conduct is fraudulent.  Id. at 428.  The Ohio Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the statute, but Columbus Skyline is most relevant for its analysis of the 
reasoning behind the drafting of the statute.  Id. at 429.  Citing the definition of “fraud” in 
section 1707.01(J), the Court emphasizes the key language of the first clause, “anything 
recognized on or after July 22, 1929, as such in courts of law or equity[.]”  Id. at 428.  The Court 
was faced with a challenge for vagueness on the grounds that this language was too broad 
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Ohio’s Blue Sky law with federal securities regulation—specifically the 
expansive nature of Ohio’s statutory language.83  Keeping in line with 
the dual-regulatory structure, the Court was unwilling to grant exclusive 
jurisdiction in antifraud matters to either state or federal regulatory 
agencies.84  Rather, the Court determined that it was necessary for state 
law to work in conjunction with federal regulations in determining what 
constitutes fraudulent behavior.85  Indeed, Columbus Skyline is illustrative 
of the state-federal securities regulatory dichotomy in that it 
demonstrates the willingness of the Ohio courts to construe “fraud” 
broadly, and thus equitably, in maintaining and promoting the goals of 
the original Ohio Securities Act.86  And despite the difference in the 
general language of the statute, the Ohio fraud statute operates to treat 
fraud in a fashion quite similar to other state law.87  Having thus laid the 
                                                                                                             
and far-reaching.  Id.  But in disagreeing with the lower court, which held that “[a] general 
rule stating that federal securities law applies to Ohio intrastate securities trading would be 
insufficient as it would be impossible for anyone to know what standard applied[,]” the 
Ohio Supreme Court emphasized a liberal construction of the antifraud provisions in order 
to further the protectionist goals of the statute.  Id. at 429.  The Court thus found it 
necessary to construe the statute so broadly because it was drafted “to address unforeseen 
variations in factual circumstances.”  Id. 
83 Id. at 429.  The Court discussed the necessity of creating such sweeping language in 
order “to address unforeseen variations in factual circumstances.”  Id.  Discussing the 
evolving nature of fraudulent conduct—specifically the “creativity of unscrupulous 
securities dealers intent on defrauding Ohio investors[]”—the Court noted that the 
lawmakers defined the statute so broadly so as not to exclude potentially fraudulent 
conduct.  Id.  Then, the Court provided two specific reasons as to why the legislators 
defined “fraud” in such generalities:  first, “[b]y incorporating into the statute a larger body 
of law by which to define fraudulent conduct, the General Assembly has provided for 
inevitable changes in market structure that might otherwise require redrafting of the 
statute[;]” second, federal standards are often more developed than state standards, and by 
allowing this incorporation, the state lawmakers prudently differ to the more specialized 
SEC in certain matters.  Id. at 429–30. 
84 Id. at 429. 
[T]he General Assembly did not limit the source of the definition [of 
certain measuring standards] solely to courts of Ohio, or even to state 
courts generally, as it easily could have done.  Rather, the legislature 
broadly drafted R.C. 1707.01(J) to draw from all securities case law 
defining fraudulent conduct in both state and federal courts. 
Id. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 430; see also United States v. Tehan, 365 F.2d 191, 194 (6th Cir. 1966); Bronaugh v. 
R. & E. Dredging Co., Inc., 242 N.E.2d 572 (Ohio 1968). 
87 See State v. Walsh, 420 N.E.2d 1013 (Ohio Ct. App. 1979) (finding criminal liability for 
fraud when a person represents facts to be different than he should have known them to be 
if he had exercised reasonable diligence in attempting to ascertain the facts).  Following the 
lead of Walsh, the Ohio Supreme Court clarified its meaning of the due diligence standard 
for fraud in 1990: 
First, it must be ascertained whether defendant exercised reasonable 
diligence to ascertain the true state of facts; and, second, it must be 
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foundation for Ohio’s general securities fraud regulation, this Note now 
shifts its focus to the issue of remedies in an unlawful sale—specifically 
the statutory language defining precisely who is afforded the remedies 
of section 1707.43. 
2. Buyers’ Remedies 
Since the NSMIA was promulgated in 1996, Ohio has retained the 
power to prosecute violators of securities fraud.88  To this end, Ohio 
provides defrauded investors with statutory relief.89  Specifically, redress 
is available under sections 1707.41,90 1707.42,91 and 1707.4392 of the Ohio 
                                                                                                             
determined whether he should, not merely could, have learned of the 
true facts in the exercise of reasonable diligence.  This is not a situation 
where one fact is presumed to exist because of the existence of another; 
but, instead in the context of this case, the jury is required to make a 
factual determination of whether the defendant represented the facts 
to be different than he should have known them to be, in the exercise 
of reasonable diligence.  This in no way infringes upon the 
presumption of innocence, since the state is required to prove, beyond 
a reasonable doubt, that the defendant in the exercise of reasonable 
diligence should have known the facts to be different than he 
represented them to be.  Actually, there is little difference between this 
standard and the standard that is ordinarily used, since it is 
permissible to infer that a defendant has knowledge of facts which he 
should have known under the circumstances involved. 
State v. Warner, 564 N.E.2d 18, 42 (Ohio 1990). 
88 See supra Part II.B. 
89 See Thomas E. Geyer, Michael P. Miglets, & Keith A. Rowley, Civil Liability and 
Remedies in Ohio Securities Transactions, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 939 (2002).  The authors note that 
Ohio common law supplements the Ohio Securities Act.  Id. at 940.  The authors go on to 
describe how the state law has grown in importance after the NSMIA, which contributed to 
reduc[ing] the number of avenues by which plaintiffs relying on 
federal law may pursue alleged wrongdoers for securities fraud, 
impos[ing] significant additional requirements on plaintiffs suing 
under federal securities law, . . . and curb[ing] the availability of state 
courts as an alternative forum in which plaintiffs may pursue 
securities fraud claims. 
Id. at 941 (quoting Keith A Rowley, Muddy Waters, Blue Skies:  Civil Liability Under the 
Mississippi Securities Act, MISS. L. J. 683, 684 (2000)).  Consequently, the authors argue, Ohio 
law may nevertheless present “attractive alternatives” in the form of state common law 
fraud claims.  Id.; see Robert L. Matia, Express and Implied Civil Liability Provisions in State 
Blue Sky Laws, 17 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1173 (1966) (discussing the multitude of available 
remedies to purchasers in securities transactions).  See generally Dale C. LaPorte, Note, 
Voidability Provisions Under State Blue Sky Laws, 17 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1148 (1966) 
(discussing the voidability remedy under both federal and state regulations, and arguing 
that the protection afforded buyers is adequate). 
90 OHIO REVISED.CODE. ANN. § 1707.41 (West, Westlaw through 2008 File 129 of the 127th 
Gen. Assembly) provides, in pertinent part: 
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Revised Code.  Stemming from the Code’s definition of fraud, section 
1707.43 provides the primary source of remedies for the purchaser in an 
unlawful sale.93 
                                                                                                             
(A)  In addition to the other liabilities imposed by law, any person 
that, by a written or printed circular, prospectus, or advertisement, 
offers any security for sale, or receives the profits accruing from such 
sale, is liable, to any person that purchased the security relying on the 
circular, prospectus, or advertisement, for the loss or damage 
sustained by the relying person by reason of the falsity of any material 
statement contained therein or for the omission of material facts, 
unless the offeror or person that receives the profits establishes that the 
offeror or person had no knowledge of the publication prior to the 
transaction complained of, or had just and reasonable grounds to 
believe the statement to be true or the omitted facts to be not 
material. . . .  
. . . . 
(C) For purposes of this section, lack of reasonable diligence in 
ascertaining the fact of a publication or the falsity of any statement 
contained in it or of the omission of a material fact shall be deemed 
knowledge of the publication and of the falsity of any untrue statement 
in it or of the omission of material facts. 
Id. 
91 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.42 (West, Westlaw through 2008 File 129 of the 127th 
Gen. Assembly) provides, in pertinent part: 
(A)  Whoever, with the intent to secure financial gain to self, advises 
and procures any person to purchase any security, and receives any 
commission or reward for the advice or services without disclosing to 
the purchaser the fact of the person’s agency or interest in such sales, 
shall be liable to the purchaser for the amount of the purchaser’s 
damage thereby, upon tender of the security to, and suit brought 
against, the adviser, by the purchaser.  
Id. 
92 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.43 (West, Westlaw through 2008 File 129 of the 127th 
Gen. Assembly) provides, in pertinent part: 
(A) Subject to divisions (B) [statute of limitations] and (C) [correction 
of error by seller] . . . , every sale or contract for sale made in violation 
of Chapter 1707. of the Revised Code, is voidable at the election of the 
purchaser.  The person making such sale or contract for sale, and every 
person that has participated in or aided the seller in any way in 
making such sale or contract for sale, are jointly and severally liable to 
the purchaser, in an action at law in any court of competent 
jurisdiction, upon tender to the seller in person or in open court of the 
securities sold or of the contract made, for the full amount paid by the 
purchaser and for all taxable court costs, unless the court determines 
that the violation did not materially affect the protection contemplated 
by the violated provision.  
Id. 
93 See James B. Farmer & Toba Jeanne Feldman, Fraud in Securities Transactions:  A 
Comparison of Civil Remedies Under the Ohio Securities Act, the Uniform Securities Act, and the 
Federal Securities Acts, 49 U. CIN. L. REV. 814, 820–21 (1980).  The authors note the relatively 
narrow scope of section 1707.41.  Id. at 820.  Because the section applies only to 
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As the statutory remedy, section 1707.43’s protective umbrella is 
limited to purchasers of securities; indeed, it fails to provide statutory 
relief for defrauded sellers.94  Armed with this statutory protection, a 
purchaser has the right to elect to void a sales contract that violates any 
provision of the Ohio Securities Act.95  Conversely, the statute fails to 
provide a statutory remedy for defrauded sellers.96  Moreover, as a frame 
of reference, the statutory language of Ohio’s corporate merger statute is 
much broader in providing remedies to parties that have been the 
victims of fraud.97  It is from this starting point that this Note proceeds to 
                                                                                                             
“misrepresentations or omissions made in printed material utilized in the sale of a 
security[,]” its usefulness is “limited.”  Id.  Additionally, “[o]nly a defrauded purchaser 
may seek relief under the statute, upon proof of materiality, negligence and reliance.”  Id.  
Likewise, section 1707.42 is also limited, as it “contains a scienter requirement and applies 
only to financial advisors.”  Id.; see also Matia, supra note 89. 
94 Compare UNIF. SECURITIES ACT § 410(a), 7A U.L.A. 568 (1958), reprinted in LOSS & 
SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 65, with OHIO R.C. § 1707.43. 
95 § 1707.43; see Farmer & Feldman, supra note 93 (discussing how only purchasers are 
granted the statutory right of rescission). 
96 See Farmer & Feldman, supra note 93, at 822.  The authors raise a compelling 
question—a question that, in fact, this Note aims to discuss in Part IV, with the facts of the 
stock-for-exchange transaction in Murphy as the springboard—“Because misstatements and 
omissions can just as easily induce a sale as a purchase,” why is not the statute expanded to 
provide a civil remedy for defrauded sellers?  Id. at 822. 
97 OHIO REV. CODE § 1701.78 (West, Westlaw through 2008 File 129 of the 127th Gen. 
Assembly) is Ohio’s corporate merger statute: 
(D) To effect the merger or consolidation, the agreement shall be 
approved by the directors of each domestic constituent corporation, 
adopted by the shareholders of each domestic constituent corporation, 
other than the surviving corporation in the case of a merger, at a 
meeting of the shareholders of each such corporation held for the 
purpose, and approved or otherwise authorized by or on behalf of 
each foreign constituent corporation in accordance with the Law of the 
state under which it exists.  In the case of a merger, the agreement shall 
also be adopted by the shareholders of the surviving corporation at a 
meeting held for the purpose, if one or more of the following 
conditions exist: . . . 
. . . .  
(3) The merger involves the issuance or transfer by the surviving 
corporation to the shareholders of the other constituent corporation or 
corporations of such number of shares of the surviving corporation as 
will entitle the holders of the shares immediately after the 
consummation of the merger to exercise one-sixth or more of the 
voting power of that corporation in the election of directors[] . . . . 
Id.  In the case of fraud perpetrated during the course of such a transaction, OHIO REV. 
CODE § 1701.93 (West, Westlaw through 2008 File 129 of the 127th Gen. Assembly), in 
pertinent part, provides general prohibitions and penalties: 
(A) No officer, director, employee, or agent of a corporation shall, 
either alone or with another or others, with intent to deceive: 
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explore section 1707.43 in terms of the Sixth Circuit’s recent decision in 
Murphy v. Stargate Defense Systems Corp.98 
3. Murphy’s Law 
Murphy considers the subtle issue of precisely who is entitled to 
statutory protection under Ohio’s Blue Sky Law, specifically the 
rescission provision of section 1707.43(A).99  Appellants (Plaintiffs at the 
trial court level) were owners of Spectrum Infrared, Inc. (“Spectrum”).100  
In 2005, Appellants sold all shares of Spectrum to Stargate Defense 
Systems Corp. (“Stargate”), a business operated by the Appellees 
(Defendants at the trial court level).101  The sale was structured as a stock 
exchange whereby the Appellants traded all their stock in Spectrum for 
stock in Stargate, essentially acquiring an interest in Stargate while 
relinquishing control of Spectrum.102  Unfortunately for Appellants, 
however, their acquired stock interest in Stargate turned out to be worth 
no value.103 
                                                                                                             
(1) Make, issue, deliver, publish, or send by mail or by any other 
means of communication any prospectus, report, circular, certificate, 
statement, balance sheet, exhibit, or document, respecting the shares, 
assets, liabilities, capital, business, dividends or distributions, earnings, 
or accounts of a corporation, that is false in any material respect, 
knowing the statement to be false; . . .  
. . . .  
(B) Whoever violates this section shall be personally liable, jointly and 
severally, with all other persons participating with the offender in any act of 
that type, to any person for any damage actually suffered and proximately 
resulting from the act. . . .  
(D) Remedies under this section are not exclusive of other remedies at 
common law or under other statutes. 
Id. (emphasis added).  From the general language of section 1707.93(B), it appears that the 
applicability of these corporate fraud statutes is not limited to just one party in the 
transaction.  But see § 1701.43 (the language of the statute limits the applicability to 
purchasers of securities). 
98 Murphy v. Stargate Defense Sys. Corp., 498 F.3d 386 (6th Cir. 2007) (the Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals applied section 1707.43, fraud during the purchase of securities, in a 
stock-for-stock exchange; sections 1707.78 and 1707.93, Ohio’s corporate merger statutes, 
were not considered in Murphy). 
99 Id. at 390. 
100 Id. at 388. 
101 Id.  In addition, plaintiffs agreed to purchase stock from defendants in two 
transactions independent of the 2005 acquisition.  Id. at 388–89.  See infra note 93 (a 
description of the dealings between Plaintiffs Murphy and Smith and Defendant 
Woodruff). 
102 Id. at 388. 
103 Id. at 389.  The trial court made many specific findings of fact; those that follow serve 
to illustrate the nature of the fraud perpetrated by Stargate Defense Systems against 
Plaintiffs John Murphy and James Smith.  Murphy v. Stargate Defense Sys. Corp., No. 1:05 
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CV 2121, 2006 WL 721746, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 21, 2006), aff’d in part, denied in part, 498 
F.3d 386 (6th Cir. 2007).  Murphy and Smith were each 50 percent shareholders in 
Spectrum, an Ohio corporation that manufactured infrared heaters used for a variety of 
commercial applications.  Id.  Contemplating retirement, the Plaintiffs advertised the 
availability of their manufacturing business.  Id.  Shortly thereafter, Defendant James 
Woodruff responded to the advertisement and requested additional information.  Id.  
Nearly six months later Woodruff represented to Smith that his corporation, Q Corp, was 
going public soon, and he was still interested in acquiring Spectrum.  Id. at *2.  During a 
meeting between Murphy and Woodruff, Woodruff represented that Q Corp did 60 
percent of its business with the United States Government, and that Q Corp was in the 
process of acquiring another business for 1.5 million dollars.  Id.  On January 4, 2002, 
Woodruff and Mitchell visited Spectrum’s facility in Cleveland, Ohio and met with 
Murphy and Smith.  Id. at *2.  At this meeting, Woodruff represented that Q Corp was in 
the process of acquiring yet another company—a gas infrared manufacturing company 
business with sales of $400,000 per year.  Id.  Murphy sent to Woodruff an appraisal of the 
Spectrum equipment, as well as a breakdown of Spectrum’s sales.  Id.  Woodruff then 
called Murphy, and left a phone message representing to Murphy that Q Corp was in the 
process of going public, and that Woodruff was interested in purchasing Spectrum with 
stock.  Id.  Woodruff further suggested that Murphy should consider making a small 
investment in Q Corp stock as part of the deal.  Id.  Murphy, Smith, and Plaintiff’s personal 
accountant met with Woodruff at the offices of Q Corp, during which time Woodruff 
represented that Q Corp had a net worth of 3.5 million dollars, and that shares were selling 
at $15 per share.  Id.  On January 25, 2002, Murphy and Smith agreed to purchase jointly 
400 shares of Q Corp and tendered a check payable to Q Corp in the amount of $12,000; 
despite this payment, no stock certificates were ever delivered.  Id.  Murphy requested 
additional information from Woodruff regarding Q Corp; in response, Woodruff corrected 
his earlier misstatement and represented to Murphy that Q Corp stock had never sold for 
less than $30 per share.  Id. at *3.  On February 1, 2002, Murphy and Smith delivered the 
signed copy of the letter of intent and Woodruff represented that everything was in place 
to close on another acquisition.  Id.  On February 4, 2002, Murphy purchased an additional 
1,000 shares of Q Corp for $20,000; no stock certificates were delivered.  Id.  The trial court 
found that Woodruff made several misrepresentations to Murphy, including that he had no 
plans to take Q Corp public.  Id.  In addition, Woodruff had been prosecuted for many 
previous fraudulent schemes involving investors.  Id.  On March 1, 2002, the Certificate of 
Incorporation of Q Corp was cancelled for failure to file annual reports and the non-
payment of taxes to the State of Delaware.  Id. at *4.  On February 20, 2002, Woodruff 
delivered to Murphy and Smith Q Corp’s Profit and Loss Statements, Balance Sheets, and a 
Prospectus for Q Corp.  Id.  This prospectus included an amalgamation of several 
corporations, financial information based on these entities, and various other information 
regarding the business activities of Q Corp.  Id.  Woodruff explained to Murphy that he 
anticipated better performance in 2002, and was now waiting for money to complete the 
acquisition of Spectrum.  Id. at *5.  Murphy and Woodruff made a number of 
communications throughout the remainder of 2002, and in March of 2003, Plaintiffs 
decided to resume their advertisement of Spectrum; they never received any serious 
interest, however.  Id. at *6.  But in June 2003, Woodruff called Murphy to assure him that 
he would have the available funds in a matter of weeks, and “they would need to get 
serious about completing the acquisition of Spectrum[.]”  Id.  Having assured Murphy that 
Q Corp was in a position to complete the acquisition, Woodruff presented Murphy and 
Smith stock certificates representing their ownership in Stargate Defense Systems (a 
Delaware Corporation formerly known as Interwoven Technologies), as well as a copy of a 
purchase agreement.  Id. at *6.  Plaintiffs executed the purchase agreement, but consulted 
an attorney on March 18, 2005.  Id.  Plaintiffs suggested that the contract should be between 
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Upon suspecting Stargate’s fraud, Murphy filed suit against Stargate 
seeking to rescind the transaction pursuant to section 1707.43(A).104  The 
District Court granted Murphy the right of rescission of previous stock 
purchases, but denied them rescission of the 2005 stock exchange.105  On 
appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with the district 
court’s conclusion that Plaintiffs were not stock “purchasers,” and 
reversed the decision in part accordingly.106 
                                                                                                             
Plaintiffs as individual shareholders of Spectrum and Stargate rather than between 
Spectrum and Stargate, but Woodruff rejected this proposed change.  Id. at *7.  The 
Purchase Agreement provided that Stargate would purchase all of the stock, assets, and 
business or product lines owned and conducted by Spectrum for $1,008,000.00 in the form 
of shares of Stargate stock which is valued at $30.00 per share.  Id.  When Murphy and 
Smith were issued shares in Stargate in March of 2005, no such corporation known as 
Stargate existed on record in either Delaware or Ohio.  Id.  Defendants were aware, but did 
not disclose, that Stargate was not qualified for holding a government contract because of 
Defendants’ previous indictments for fraud.  Id.  Despite the inconsistencies in the stock 
certificates, representations made about products and acquisitions, and the previous 
indictments and sentencing of Woodruff, Plaintiffs did not begin to suspect until June 2005 
that that a fraud had been perpetrated upon them because the Defendants isolated the 
Plaintiffs and their former employees from the corporate records and the operations of 
Stargate.  Id. at *8.  During the period in which Stargate acquired the operations of 
Spectrum, Spectrum received cancellation of its insurance coverage for nonpayment of its 
premiums and a  a demand letter for two months rent in arrears, and Stargate began to run 
its payroll through Spectrum because Stargate had no money coming in and its bank 
account balances were negative.  Id. at *9.  Additionally, suppliers of Spectrum indicated 
that accounts had become past due, and they threatened to cut off critical supplies.  Id.  
Finally, on August 3, 2005, Plaintiffs tendered their share certificates into the court, and 
requested rescission of the stock sales.  Id. 
104 Murphy, 498 F.3d at 388.  Central to Plaintiffs complaint is their allegation that they 
were induced to enter the transactions as a result of the fraudulent misrepresentations and 
omissions made by Defendants.  Id.  Plaintiffs brought federal claims in addition to their 
state statutory and common law claims.  Id.  Their allegations charged defendants with 
violations of federal Rule 10b-5, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.44, and Ohio common law.  
Id.  The only issue on appeal, however, concerns the scope of Ohio’s Blue Sky law, OHIO 
REV.CODE ANN §§ 1701.01–99, specifically whether the Plaintiffs were “purchasers” for 
purposes of the right of rescission available under section 1707.43.  Id. 
105   Murphy, 2007 WL 721746 at *1.  In a brief footnote, the district court addressed the 
issue of whether the Plaintiffs were entitled to protection under the Ohio Blue Sky law.  Id. 
at *12.  Determining that, in fact, Plaintiffs were not purchasers, the district court relied on 
the well-settled law of Nickels v. Koehler Mgmt. Corp.,  541 F.2d 611, 616 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. 
denied, 429 U.S. 1074 (1977).  Murphy, 498 F.3d at 391.  Nickels expounds clearly the 
standard:  “The blue sky law provides a remedy only for a defrauded purchaser, and not 
for a defrauded seller.”  541 F.2d at 616.  Nevertheless, the Sixth Circuit found error in the 
district courts failure to examine the specifics of the transaction, i.e., a stock-for-stock 
transaction, in determining who, in fact, is the “purchaser” and who is the “seller.”  
Murphy, 498 F.3d at 391. 
106 Murphy, 498 F.3d at 391 (reversing the district court with respect to its denial of 
Plaintiffs’ right of rescission under section 1707.43). 
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Although Murphy conceded that Nickels v. Koehler Management 
Corp.107 precludes Blue Sky protection for defrauded sellers, they argued 
that both parties acted as stock purchasers in the 2005 stock exchange, 
and therefore are entitled to protection under section 1707.43.108  After 
reviewing the purpose of the Ohio Blue Sky Law,109 the Sixth Circuit 
court rested its analysis on the unique nature of the stock exchange in 
which both parties essentially purchased shares in a different 
corporation.110  The court relied on Indemnity Insurance Co. of North 
America v. Kircher111 in distinguishing the stock-for-stock transaction 
from the typical buy-sell transaction to which the statutory language 
specifically referred.112  Thus, it is this critical distinction for which the 
district court failed to account when it simply ignored the pressing 
question:  who, for purposes of Blue Sky protection, was the actual 
seller?113 
After Murphy, there is uncertainty when it comes to who is afforded 
the protection of Ohio’s Blue Sky Law as illustrated by the disagreement 
in interpretation between the District Court and the Sixth Circuit.114  The 
Sixth Circuit held narrowly that, in the instance of this stock-for-stock 
exchange, both parties are afforded the remedy of rescission when the 
other acts fraudulently.115  It is within this framework that this Note 
proceeds to analyze the implications of the Murphy ruling for future 
securities-fraud actions in the unique case of a defrauded “seller” in a 
                                                 
107 541 F.2d 611. 
108 Murphy, 498 F.3d at 391. 
109 See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
110 Murphy, 498 F.3d at 391.  Holding that “plaintiffs should be regarded as purchasers for 
purposes of Ohio’s Blue Sky Law[,]” the court then examined the meaning of “sale” in a 
securities transaction:  “‘The sale of a security . . . means among other things an exchange of 
securities, and as one who acquires by sale is a purchaser, so is a purchaser one who 
acquires by an exchange of securities.’”  Id. (quoting Indem Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Kircher, 
191 N.E. 374, 376 (Ohio Ct. App. 1934)).  See Sec. Exch. Comm’n. v. Nat’l Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 
453, 467–68 (1969) (quoting Dasho v. Susquehanna Corp., 380 F.2d 262, 269 (7th Cir. 1967) 
(holding that, “in a merger, shareholders . . . effectively purchas[ing] shares in a new 
corporation while ‘losing their status as shareholders’ in the previous corporation[]”); 
Mader v. Armel, 402 F.2d 158, 160 (6th Cir. 1968) (quoting Dasho, 380 F.2d at 269) (holding 
that, in the context of a federal securities fraud claim, “when the merger was approved and 
the exchange of securities occurred, the owner of stock had in effect purchased a new 
security and paid for it by turning in his old one[]”). 
111 191 N.E. at 376. 
112 Murphy, 498 F.3d at 391. 
113 See generally Murphy v. Stargate Defense Sys. Corp., No. 1:05 CV 2121, 2006 WL 
721746. 
114 See supra note 106 (discussing the Sixth Circuit’s reversal of the lower court’s decision 
to deny the seller of stock the statutory right of rescission when defrauded by a buyer). 
115 Murphy, 498 F.3d 386 at 391. 
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stock-for-stock exchange.116  To this end, Part III examines the relevancy 
of the uniformity debate, how the Sixth Circuit court’s interpretation of 
Ohio’s Blue Sky Law in Murphy has effectively expanded the protection 
afforded to parties seeking securities-fraud remedies, and ultimately, 
whether there is a need to amend section 1707.43 to include a statutory 
right of rescission in a stock-for-stock exchange.117 
III.  ANALYSIS 
Because misstatements and omissions can just as easily induce a sale as a 
purchase, the state statutes should be expanded to provide a civil remedy for 
defrauded sellers.118 
 
With a history dominated by a dual regulatory structure, it is clear 
that no mandatory uniform standards exist among states in their 
securities fraud regulation.119  As a result, states have defined fraud 
uniquely, and additionally, made available specific remedies to victims 
of fraud.120  Despite a movement towards uniformity, however, the effort 
has fallen short of achieving its goal—specifically among the various 
state antifraud statutes.121 
As a case-in-point, Ohio has limited the right of rescission in 
securities fraud actions to buyers of stock.122  In determining how to 
interpret Ohio’s Blue Sky law in terms of stock exchanges, three major 
points of analysis must be considered.  First, Part III.A of this Note 
addresses how after the NSMIA the debate surrounding uniformity 
appears to be well-settled:  the states retain power to prosecute fraud, 
and, despite proposed uniform acts, there appears to be little motivation 
for states to eradicate inconsistencies among their antifraud 
provisions.123  Second, Part III.B discusses the Murphy Court’s 
                                                 
116 See infra Part III. 
117 See infra Part III. 
118 Farmer & Feldman, supra note 93, at 822. 
119 See supra Part II.B (discussing the NSMIA as a response to a lack of uniformity, and 
the resulting lack of uniformity vis-à-vis state securities fraud regulation). 
120 See supra note 25. 
121 See supra Part II.B (discussing the states’ ultimate retention of power to prosecute 
fraud, and consequently, the power to construe their fraud provisions as they see fit); see 
also Denos, supra note 18, at 105 (discussing how the NSMIA was a step toward uniformity 
between the state and federal securities regulation agencies, but because of the deeply-
rooted dual regulatory structure, total federal preemption of state law has not been 
achieved). 
122 See supra Part II.C (explaining Ohio’s Blue Sky Law remedies, specifically how sellers 
of stock have no statutory right of rescission when defrauded by a buyer in a stock-for-
stock exchange). 
123 See infra Part III.A. 
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construction of Ohio’s Blue Sky Law in the case of a fraudulent stock-for-
stock transaction, focusing specifically on the ambiguity in the text of the 
statute concerning who is afforded the right of rescission.124  Finally, in 
light of the Murphy Court’s willingness to extend Blue Sky protection to 
both parties in a stock-for-stock transaction, Part III.C addresses why 
Ohio’s Blue Sky statute should be re-formulated to explicitly include 
both parties in a stock-for-stock exchange.125  In sum, Part III examines 
how the analysis of fraud in a stock-for-stock exchange introduces a set 
of circumstances that need to be accounted for in Ohio’s state securities 
fraud regulation.126 
A. Uniformity:  How Has the NSMIA Affected the Uniformity Debate? 
Reacting to multiple unsuccessful attempts to overhaul the complex 
dual regulatory system of securities regulation, Congress enacted the 
NSMIA in 1996.127  Because of the frustrating complexity, those who 
supported the NSMIA lauded its attempts to address the patchwork 
system that existed under one federal regulatory umbrella.128  To those in 
favor of state uniformity, however, the NSMIA’s ultimate effect proved 
to be much more form than substance.129  Although the NSMIA 
developed under the auspices of encouraging uniformity, certainly its 
effect has not been to establish uniformity among all aspects of securities 
regulation.130  As a result, commentators on both sides of the uniformity 
debate are left unsatisfied.131 
                                                 
124 See infra Part III.B. 
125 See infra Part III.C. 
126 See infra Part III. 
127 See supra note 58.  
128 See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
129 See Sargent, NSMIA, supra note 55, at 507 (describing how the NSMIA fell short of a 
fundamental reordering because the states retained so much regulatory power); see also 
Campbell, Jr., Recent Congressional Preemption, supra note 58 (explaining that changes are 
generally insignificant as the states ultimately retained the most important power—
prosecution of fraud). 
130 See supra notes 57–58 and accompanying text (describing precisely what powers were 
granted to the states and what powers were left to the SEC). 
131 Compare McWilliams, supra note 18 (lauding the benefits of establishing uniformity 
between state and federal law, although cautioning that this pursuit should not serve as a 
catch-all trump to the unique interests of each state), with Campbell, Jr., Open Attack, supra 
note 58 (promoting total preemption because state antifraud laws are essentially the same 
as federal laws), Dahlquist, supra note 18, at 393 (encouraging uniformity among states 
because of the time-consuming task involved in analyzing all state blue sky laws when 
attempting to ensure that a security issue is in compliance with all applicable state 
statutes), Maynard, supra note 54, at 393 (same), and Denos, supra note 18, at 102 (discussing 
how many state provisions are at odds with comparable federal provisions). 
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1. Uniformity:  The Arguments on Both Sides of the Debate 
The most basic proposition asserted against a uniform system of 
federal securities regulation is rooted in Federalism.132  Historically, state 
Blue Sky Law was the first type of securities regulations, and by 1933, 
every state had such a law.133  Moreover, each state has its own unique 
motivation regulating securities in a particular manner.134  Flowing 
naturally from these positions is the fear that the federal government 
would unnecessarily usurp too much power from the states if it had sole 
jurisdiction over securities regulation.135  Additionally, and more 
pragmatically, there are necessary limitations on the effectiveness and 
prudence of allowing the SEC full regulatory power over the 
“tremendously variegated industries in this vast country.”136  Relying on 
this practicality argument, those opposed to a uniform system of federal 
regulation understand that “reasonabl[e] coordinat[ion] with the federal 
legislation[]” is a satisfactory alternative to the “hodgepodge” of state 
statutes that flourished prior to any efforts aimed at uniformity.137 
                                                 
132 See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 57–58. 
133 See McWilliams, supra note 18, at 248.  McWilliams discusses two reasons for having 
two sets of regulations—one historical, one theoretical.  Id.  First, states had regulations in 
place before 1933, the time at which the first federal securities regulation statute was 
enacted.  Id.  Second, the federal securities laws “embody a theory of enforcement different 
than that of most state laws[] . . . .”  Id.  For these reasons, McWilliams argues, it is 
necessary to look at both regulatory structures in terms of the other.  Id. 
134 Sargent, Future for Blue Sky Law, supra note 55, at 498–99.  Sargent, admittedly 
cynically, describes state agencies as “cash cows for state general revenues.”  Id. at 499.  He 
notes that it is typical for a state to have a very high ratio of budgets to revenues.  Id.  As a 
result, according to Sargent, there is an economic disincentive for the states to relinquish 
regulatory control to the federal government.  Id.; see also LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 18, 
at 149 (citing a 1984 study that reports in more than 30 jurisdictions Blue Sky Law securities 
enforcement has become a primary source of revenue). 
135 See supra note 55 and accompanying text (explaining that states retained substantial 
interest in maintaining jurisdiction over securities regulation, whether it be from a financial 
or states’ rights perspective); see also supra note 132 (discussing the federalism concerns of 
states). 
136 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 59.  Loss and Seligman point to the abstract and 
theoretical underpinnings of the argument in favor of total uniformity as reasons why the 
dual regulatory structure should be maintained.  Id.  In support of their position, they cite a 
study of the SEC for the opinion of those who have experienced the intricacies and 
complexities of the regulatory structure first hand:  “There has not been and should not be 
Federal preemption in the field of securities regulation.”  Id. (citing Report of Special Study of 
Securities Markets, H.R. DOC. NO. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 734 (1963)).  Loss and Seligman, 
speaking from experience, suggest that “[p]erhaps it requires a substantial tenure in 
government to appreciate the limitations of government.”  LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 18, 
at 59. 
137 Id.  The authors appear to be content with this current system of “reasonabl[e] 
coordinat[ion]” as a satisfactory middle ground that encompasses aims of both federalism 
and post-1956 coordination of state securities regulation.  Id. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 1 [2008], Art. 7
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol43/iss1/7
2008] Defrauded Parties in a Stock-for-Stock Exchange 335 
On the other hand, strong support exists for absolute federal 
preemption of state securities regulation.138  Eugene Rostow condemns 
Justice Brandeis’s federalism argument as supportive of excessive 
regulation.139  Moreover, the complexities of the various state regulations 
have all but rendered state Blue Sky Law meaningless in effect.140  And 
                                                 
138 Eugene V. Rostow, Book Review, 62 YALE L.J. 675, 677 (1953).  Rostow takes great 
issue with the federalism argument posited by Loss and Seligman.  Id.  Trumpeting the 
simplification of “financial practice without weakening the protection of investors[,]” 
Rostow concludes that the dual-regulatory structure was needless.  Id.  In addition, the 
former Chairman of the SEC, after his resignation, commented that: 
The ‘blue sky’ law had come to have a special meaning—a meaning 
full of complexities, surprises, unsuspected liabilities for transactions 
normal and usual—in short, a crazy-quilt of state regulations no longer 
significant or meaningful in purpose, and usually stultifying in effect, 
or just plain useless. 
J. Sinclair Armstrong, Comment, The Blue Sky Laws, 44 VA. L. REV. 713, 714–15 (1958).  It is 
clear from this scathing condemnation of the state regulation that Armstrong favored 
federal preemption.  Id.; see Campbell, Jr., Open Attack, supra note 54, at 575 (noting that 
state antifraud regulation should be preempted by federal regulation because of the 
similarities between section 101 of the Uniform Securities Act of 1956 and rule 10b-5 under 
the 1934 Act).  But see LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 59 (arguing against Rostow’s 
simplification argument by suggesting that the securities regulation field is too complex for 
federal preemption).  But see LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 57–58 (quoting New State 
Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).  “It is one of the 
happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens 
choose, serve as a laboratory[] and try novel social and economic experiments without risk 
to the rest of the country.”  Id.  Loss & Seligman, commenting on Justice Brandeis’s 
admonition of the Court’s willingness to embrace notions of uniformity, comment that 
“[a]s a matter of principle, it is difficult to justify the federal government’s telling the states 
that they cannot try to protect their citizens beyond the federal disclosure philosophy.”  Id.  
As the authors point out, however, many who do make this argument do not extend its 
application beyond disclosure regulations.  Id. 
139 See Rostow, supra note 138, at 677 (commenting that securities regulation is an area in 
which “multiple regulation by the states and the national government is a monument to the 
shibboleth, not the reality, of federalism[]”). 
140 See Armstrong, supra note 138.  Armstrong extends the uniformity argument to its 
logical extreme—total preemption of state regulation.  Considering the interest of the 
public investor along side the regulatory purpose served by state regulation of securities, 
Armstrong concludes that state regulation is meaningless; he views these regulations as 
unnecessary interference with the interstate securities markets.  Id. at 713–14.  As a result, 
he posits not an overhaul of state law, but rather federal preemption.  Id. at 714.  
Armstrong, aware of those in favor of states’ rights who would oppose his rather extreme 
argument, finds nothing in his argument that should be opposed by those in favor of states’ 
rights.  Id.  According to Armstrong, the process of investment and capital formation is 
necessarily national in nature; the investment market is nationwide, and to this end, only 
federal regulation should be mandated.  Id. at 717.  Ultimately, Armstrong supports his 
position against state co-ordinate antifraud regulation with the following argument: 
Thus the states, exercising their sovereign police power in an economic 
area of interstate significance, have distorted their original purpose to 
protect their citizens against fraud.  Instead they have set up a 
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as Rutheford B. Campbell, Jr. posits, the similarities in statutory 
language between the antifraud provisions of the 1934 Act and section 
101 of the Uniform Securities Act provide convincing evidence for total 
preemption.141  From the perspective of one dealing in securities, 
working with multiple, varied state statutes entails unnecessary 
duplicative work.142 
Nevertheless, regardless of one’s position in the uniformity debate, 
Blue Sky Law appears to be a fixture in securities regulation.143  
Accepting this position, it appears as if the best response to the 
uniformity debate is to recognize the dual-regulatory structure as a 
reality and to proceed with an optimistic recognition that state and 
federal regulation work together, both serving valid regulatory 
purposes.144  Indeed, it is clear that strong arguments exist both in favor 
of and against uniformity—so strong, in fact, that Congress addressed 
the matter by enacting the NSMIA.145  Whether Congress achieved this 
goal, however, is a critical point of analysis.146 
                                                                                                             
protective machinery, often based on local interests, which is 
completely antithetical to the public interest in free and open corporate 
securities markets. 
Id. at 718.  Therefore the nation-wide scope of the market renders the “appearance of 
providing a state’s citizens with protection against investment folly[]” illusory when a 
citizen of one state could easily travel to another state, engage in a securities transaction, 
and be subject to a different set of fraud statutes.  Id. 
141 See Campbell, Jr., Open Attack, supra note 54, at 576; see also supra note 58 and 
accompanying text. 
142 See Dahlquist, supra note 18, at 393.  As a lawyer with actual experience in the field of 
securities regulation, Dahlquist expresses his displeasure with being forced to comply with 
multiple, inconsistent statutes: 
Only a lawyer who has had the actual experience of qualifying a 
security issue in almost all of the . . . states which have some form of 
blue-sky law, concurrently with or immediately following registration 
under the Securities Act of 1934, has any real comprehension of the 
stupendous, tedious and wasteful task involved.  It entails a vast 
amount of expensive duplicative work, most of which signifies 
nothing. 
Id.; see also Denos, supra note 18 (admonishing the dual-regulatory structure as a hindrance 
when attempting to combat fraud); supra note 59 (discussing the aims of investor protection 
and efficiency as supportive of uniformity). 
143 See Warren, Merit Regulation, supra note 19.  Warren analyzes the history of the state 
regulations, and concludes that “[l]egislative and judicial recognition ha[ve] established 
and preserved a dual regulatory system.”  Id. at 134.  In addition to this firm historical 
foundation, Warren praises the dual system as assisting to “provide the legitimacy 
required for investor participation in the capital formation process.”  Id. 
144 See Facciolo & Stone, supra note 18 (suggesting that considering federal securities law 
concepts when construing state statutory provisions). 
145 See S. REP. NO. 104–293, supra note 59, at 39 (the Act was intended to modernize 
regulatory scheme, characterized by duplicative and unnecessary regulation); see also 
Dahlquist, supra note 18, at 393 (speaking from the perspective of a lawyer with actual 
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2. Did the NSMIA Achieve Its Goal of Uniformity? 
Reacting to the lack of regulatory uniformity that has spawned more 
than half a century of fervent debate, Congress set out to eradicate the 
inefficiencies caused by the duplicative regulatory structure.147  Prior to 
the NSMIA, the arguments in support of Blue Sky Law supported the 
complex dual-regulatory scheme.148  Attempting to combat this disarray 
and inconsistent regulatory landscape, Congress approved the 
legislation.149  Granting the SEC exclusive regulatory powers appeared to 
be a step toward the goal of uniformity between the states and the 
federal government.150  However, by allowing the states to retain the 
power to prosecute fraud, it appears that the NSMIA failed in its goal of 
achieving total uniformity.151 
One argument, although made prior to the enactment of the NSMIA, 
is particularly relevant to this analysis because it champions consistent, 
federal antifraud regulation, precisely that which the NSMIA sought to 
avoid.152  Campbell, Jr. poses the typical argument in favor of absolute 
preemption.153  His reasons include a reduction of unnecessary and 
superfluous regulation, as well as a reduction of the economic burdens 
created by state variations.154  But while seemingly workable in the 
abstract, Campbell, Jr.’s argument fails to account for the practical 
                                                                                                             
experience in the field of securities regulation, the author expresses displeasure with being 
forced to comply with multiple, inconsistent statutes). 
146 See infra Part III.A.2 (positing that by leaving antifraud regulation with the states, the 
NSMIA failed in achieving uniformity between state and federal securities regulation). 
147 See S. REP. NO. 104–293 (1996), supra note 59, at 39 (explaining that Congress set out to 
promote investment and capital development in response to the ineffective, duplicative 
regulatory system). 
148 See, e.g., Sargent, A Future for Blue Sky Law, supra note 55, at 498–99 (noting how both 
state governments and state regulators were committed to providing state protection to 
investors). 
149 See supra notes 57, 59 and accompanying text; see also Denos, supra note 18, at 102 
(noting that the NSMIA is a manifestation of strong feelings in favor of a single regulatory 
system). 
150 See supra note 57 (although regulation of fraud was left to the states, the NSMIA 
delegated exclusively to the SEC regulation of certain activities related to the offering, 
promotion, and sale of nationally traded securities). 
151 See Sargent, A Future for Blue Sky Law, supra note 55; supra note 59 and accompanying 
text. 
152 See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
153 Campbell, Jr., An Open Attack, supra note 54, at 575 (Campbell, Jr. argues in favor of 
absolute preemption because most state antifraud laws are substantially the same as the 
federal 10b-5 standard). 
154 See id. at 577 (discussing the economic burdens of researching and evaluating 
materials in multiple jurisdictions); see also Dahlquist, supra note 18, at 393 (expressing his 
displeasure as a practicing attorney having to comply with multiple, inconsistent statutes); 
supra note 140 and accompanying text. 
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limitations of such preemption.155  The SEC is simply not capable of 
prosecuting all cases of fraud, and Congress consciously reserved these 
powers for the states.156 
It is clear that the NSMIA’s delegation of antifraud regulation to the 
states fell short of uniformity in the eyes of those who argue for absolute 
uniformity.157  Nevertheless, the promulgation of the NSMIA made it 
clear that a need still exists for some semblance of consistency in the 
language of the statutes.158  Consistency among the state fraud statutes 
does not require uniform federal regulation, however.159  The arguments 
in favor of uniformity, particularly Dahlquist’s position rooted in 
economic efficiency, still provide an incentive for consistency in fraud 
regulation from state to state.160  What is clear from this debate is that 
uniformity among the state regulatory structures is a worthwhile 
pursuit, even if not mandated by federal legislation.161 
3. A More Effective Means of Promoting Uniformity—The Uniform 
Securities Act of 1956 
It is apparent that granting the SEC partial regulatory power has not 
proven to be an effective means toward promoting uniformity among 
state regulatory agencies.162  Before the NSMIA’s move toward a 
uniform, federal regulatory structure, the Uniform Securities Act of 1956 
first sought to minimize the diversity that flourished among the various 
state Blue Sky Laws.163  The 1956 Act was intended to promote 
uniformity in a manner substantially different from the NSMIA.164  
                                                 
155 See supra notes 136–38 (Loss and Seligman argue against preemption by suggesting 
that the securities regulation field is too complex for federal preemption). 
156 See supra notes 136–38 (Loss and Seligman argue against preemption by suggesting 
that the securities regulation field is too complex for federal preemption). 
157 See Sargent, NSMIA, supra note 55, at 507 (noting how despite the NSMIA’s profound 
impact on the state-federal regulatory dichotomy, it surely fell short of a fundamental 
reordering); see also supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
158 See S. REP. NO. 104–293, supra note 59, at 39 (the NSMIA was intended to modernize 
the regulatory scheme, characterized by unnecessary regulation). 
159 See infra Part III.A.3 (discussion of the Uniform Securities Act of 1956 as an effective 
means of promoting uniformity). 
160 See supra notes 138–42 and accompanying text; Dahlquist, supra note 18, at 393 
(emphasizing the practical difficulties of the necessary duplicative work caused by being 
forced to comply with multiple, inconsistent statutes. 
161 See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
162 See supra Part III.A.2 (discussing the NSMIA’s shortcomings in promoting uniformity 
among state legislation). 
163 See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
164 See supra note 58 and accompanying text for a discussion of how, by leaving antifraud 
regulation with the states, the NSMIA seemed to achieve the result of dissuading the states 
from seeking uniformity.  Compare LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 50 (exploring the 
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Analyzing this difference between a model act and federal legislation 
makes clear that a carefully structured model act does more to encourage 
uniformity among the states than legislation that essentially grants the 
states free reign in constructing their legislation.165 
As a model act, the Uniform Securities Act of 1956 operates as a 
paradigm of securities regulation intended to better integrate the 
regulatory action of states and the SEC.166  After the NSMIA, it is clear 
that the fore of this state and federal integration is in the form of 
antifraud regulation.167  Thus, it makes perfect sense that the Act 
proposed a uniform definition and treatment of fraud.168  Desiring to 
embrace this uniform approach, many states have adopted, or have 
substantially adopted, the Act’s antifraud provisions.169  Based on the 
Uniform Securities Act of 1956, many states have taken affirmative steps 
toward adopting uniform antifraud provisions in an effort to minimize 
the “burden of their separate legislation on interstate commerce.”170 
But in order to achieve its desired ends most effectively, a uniform 
act must be either entirely thorough—explicitly enumerating as many 
possible contingencies as necessary—or substantially general, so as not 
to exclude any possible contingencies.171  A regulatory scheme can 
promote uniformity either concerning those aspects of the regulatory 
system that it mentions explicitly, or, conversely, by being so general as 
                                                                                                             
inherent impracticalities of expecting complete uniformity among states with different 
regulatory philosophies), with Part II.B (discussing how the NSMIA was federal legislation, 
and as such, states were not left with the option to choose model legislation). 
165 See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 50. 
166 See supra note 42 and accompanying text (comparing the language of the model act for 
states found in the Uniform Securities Act of 1956 with the language of federal regulation 
10b-5). 
167 See supra note 58 and accompanying text. 
168 See supra notes 44–49 (discussing the model statutory definition of fraudulent practices 
in connection with the sale or purchase of a security, sanctions for fraudulent practices, and 
precisely who is afforded the protection of these statutes). 
169 See supra notes 38–40 (noting that 34 out of the 39 Uniform Securities Act Jurisdictions 
have adopted section 101—the general definition of fraudulent practices in connection with 
the sale or purchase of a security). 
170 LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 60; see also supra note 18 (discussing of the 
arguments in favor of uniformity both between states and also between state and federal 
regulation). 
171 See generally Part II.C.3.  See, e.g., Murphy v. Stargate Defense Sys. Corp., 498 F.3d 386 
(6th Cir. 2007) (analyzing the unique instance of a stock-for-stock exchange in which it is 
difficult to determine who is the seller, and thus who is protected by the statute; this 
specific instance is not covered by Ohio’s Blue Sky provision); see also Farmer & Feldman, 
supra note 93, at 822 (raising the obvious—yet critical—question as to what practical 
reasons exist for excluding defrauded sellers or securities?). 
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not to exclude implicit contingencies.172  Thus, if truly seeking 
consistency, the model act must be able to account for all areas in which 
inconsistency is possible.173 
Fitting squarely into this assessment is the Uniform Securities Act’s 
omission of sellers of securities from the protection of state Blue Sky 
antifraud regulation.174  Section 410(a) explicitly limits the statutory 
protection of the Act to buyers.175  The Act would have been best served 
to preempt the possibility of leaving to state courts the responsibility of 
construing common-law seller remedies by simply including them with 
the remedies available to sellers.176 
Although providing seller protection was not a concern to the 
drafters of the 1956 Act, it is nonetheless worth analyzing for two 
reasons.177  First, this absence from the regulatory scheme seems to 
contravene the goals of uniformity.178  Second, and most important to the 
analysis that follows, omitting sellers leaves unnecessary interpretive 
discretion to the courts, resulting in potentially inconsistent statutory 
construction that could be easily avoided.179  To this end, the remainder 
of Part III explores these issues in the framework of the Sixth Circuit 
                                                 
172 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.  The NSMIA delegated to the SEC all aspects 
of securities regulation except for regulating fraud, which it specifically excluded.  See supra 
note 58 and accompanying text.  By a similar analysis, model statutes can promote 
uniformity only as to those provisions it mentions explicitly; model statutes cannot be 
expected to achieve uniformity as to that which is excluded.  See supra note 58 and 
accompanying text. 
173 See infra Part III.B (discussing, as a case in point, the failure to account for cases in 
which it might be difficult to define precisely who is the “purchaser” and who is the 
“seller” for purposes of statutory protection). 
174 See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 65 (quoting UNIF. SECURITIES ACT § 101, 7A 
U.L.A. 568 (1958), Draftsman’s Commentary) (discussing the limitation to buyers as 
appropriate in light of common-law remedies of rescission).  The drafters of the Act felt 
compelled to limit the protection to buyers because of the common-law and equitable 
remedies available to the state courts.  Id.; see also supra note 42 (noting that the language of 
model section 410(a) excludes sellers from the category of “protected entity[]”). 
175 UNIF. SECURITIES ACT § 410(a), 7A U.L.A. 568 (1958), reprinted in LOSS & SELIGMAN, 
supra note 18, at 65. 
176 See infra Parts III.B–C (discussing why sellers should be granted the same statutory 
remedies as buyers). 
177 See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 65 (quoting UNIF. SECURITIES ACT § 101, 7A 
U.L.A. 568 (1958), Draftsman’s Commentary). 
178 See McWilliams, supra note 18, at 253 n.53 (noting that the purpose behind the 
Uniform Securities Act of 1956 was to promote uniformity in the interpretation and 
administration of state regulation); see also supra note 172 and accompanying text 
(discussing how the omission of buyers necessarily hinders uniformity by inviting 
inconsistent judicial interpretation). 
179 See supra Sections II.C.2–3 (discussing the issue of potentially inconsistent judicial 
interpretation in the context of the Murphy decision). 
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Court’s interpretation of who is afforded statutory relief under Ohio Blue 
Sky Law in the case of a stock-for-stock exchange.180 
B. The Murphy Court’s Broad Interpretation of Available Statutory Remedies 
Due to an “Unforeseen Variation in Factual Circumstances” 
To probe how Ohio’s Blue Sky Law regulates a stock-for-stock 
exchange, this Note explores Ohio case law interpretation of the 
reasoning behind Ohio’s Blue Sky statutes.181  Although the language is 
not fashioned after the model statute, Ohio’s fraud remedy statute 
operates similarly.182  Both statutes provide a statutory cause of action 
exclusively to buyers of securities, and both statutes neglect to provide 
such relief to sellers in such transactions.183  Thus, based on the plain 
meaning of these statutes, sellers and buyers are granted substantially 
different avenues of relief.184  In order to unravel the meaning of this 
subtle distinction it is necessary to examine further the rationale behind 
Ohio’s Blue Sky statutes.185 
                                                 
180 See infra Parts III.B–C. 
181 See United States v. Tehan, 365 F.2d 191, 194 (6th Cir. 1966) (“The power of the State to 
provide for the general welfare authorizes it to establish such regulations as will secure or 
tend to secure the people against ignorance often due from an incomplete disclosure of 
facts by one in the unique position to know the facts.”); Bronaugh v. R. & E. Dredging Co., 
Inc., 242 N.E.2d 572, 576 (Ohio 1968) (“[T]he purpose . . . is to prevent those persons willing 
to market worthless or unnecessarily risky securities from soliciting the purchasing public 
without first subjecting themselves and their securities to reasonable licensing and 
registration requirements designed to protect the public from its own stupidity, gullibility 
and avariciousness.”). 
182 Compare UNIF. SECURITIES ACT § 410(a), 7A U.L.A. 568 (1958), reprinted in LOSS & 
SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 65. 
Section 410(a) permits a buyer to sue either at law or in equity to 
recover the consideration paid for the security, together with interest at 
six per cent per year from the date of payment, costs, and reasonable 
attorney’s fees, less the amount of any income received on the security, 
upon the tender of the security, or for damages if he no longer owns 
the security. 
Id., with OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.43 (West, Westlaw through 2008 File 129 of the 127th 
Gen. Assembly) which provides, in pertinent part:  “(A) Subject to divisions (B) [statute of 
limitations,] and (C) [correction of error by seller], every sale or contract for sale made in 
violation of Chapter 1707 of the Revised Code, is voidable at the election of the purchaser.”  
Id. (emphasis added). 
183 See supra note 182 and accompanying text. 
184 See supra note 182 and accompanying text; see also Farmer & Feldman, supra note 93; 
supra note 94. 
185 See LOSS & SELIGMAN, supra note 18, at 65 (quoting UNIF. SECURITIES ACT § 101, 7A 
U.L.A. 568 (1958), Draftsman’s Commentary); see also infra Part III.C (discussing sections 
1707.43’s limitation to purchasers of securities in light of the statute’s purpose of protecting 
individuals from incomplete disclosure of facts by one in a unique position to know all the 
facts).  
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Just as with statutory interpretation, much can be gleaned from the 
chosen language of the courts.  In United States v. Tehan, the Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals discussed the reasons for the antifraud provisions, 
referring to aims of “secur[ing] the people against ignorance often due 
from an incomplete disclosure of facts by one in the unique position to 
know the facts.”186  In Tehan, the court does not distinguish between 
buyers and sellers regarding who needs protection of the laws; rather, 
the court specifically refers to protecting “the people . . . from an 
incomplete disclosure of the facts[.]”187  Additionally, the Tehan Court 
does not limit its analysis to either buyers or sellers, thereby not 
foreclosing the possibility that a seller, too, could be in a “unique 
position” of not knowing all the facts.188  Moreover, in Holderman v. 
Columbus Skyline, the Ohio Supreme Court found it necessary to construe 
the fraud statute broadly because it determined that the statute was 
drafted “to address unforeseen variations in factual circumstances.”189  It 
is apparent that the broad interpretation and application of Ohio’s Blue 
Sky antifraud statutes, combined with the judicial recognition of the 
potential for unforeseen variations, support the contention that sellers, 
too, should be afforded statutory causes of action—or at the very least 
these judicial interpretations support the argument that the exclusion of 
                                                 
186 United States v. Tehan, 365 F.2d 191, 194 (6th Cir. 1966). 
187 Id. 
188 Id.  But when the buyer is “purchasing” from the seller by means of a stock, the 
positions are in essence reversed, placing the seller in the “unique position” of not knowing 
all the facts pertaining to the tendered security.  See Murphy v. Stargate Defense Sys. Corp., 
498 F.3d 386, 391 (6th Cir. 2007): 
Under the circumstances of the exchange of stock between the parties 
to this action, we hold that plaintiffs should be regarded as purchasers 
for purposes of Ohio’s Blue Sky Law.  ‘The sale of a security . . . means 
among other things an exchange of securities, and as one who acquires 
by sale is a purchaser, so is a purchaser one who acquires by an 
exchange of securities.’ 
Id. (quoting Indem Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Kircher, 191 N.E. 374, 376 (Ohio Ct. App. 1934); see 
also Bronaugh v. R. & E. Dredging Co., Inc., 242 N.E.2d 572 (Ohio 1968).  Bronaugh cites the 
following as the purpose of the antifraud provisions:  “[T]o prevent those persons willing 
to market worthless or unnecessarily risky securities from soliciting the purchasing 
public . . . and . . . to protect the public from its own stupidity, gullibility and 
avariciousness.”  Id.  This is clearly language referencing a seller taking advantage of the 
purchasing public.  However, this language does not prevent a broad interpretation of the 
statute; indeed, both the seller and the buyer could potentially market worthless or 
unnecessarily risky securities for sale, or as a means of purchase.  But see supra note 3 and 
accompanying text (noting that the majority of securities fraud cases involve the seller as 
the party in the unique position of knowing all the facts). 
189 Holderman, Comm’r v. Columbus Skyline Sec. (In re Columbus Skyline Sec., Inc.), 660 
N.E.2d 427, 428 (Ohio 1996); see Geyer, supra note 69 (providing support of the Columbus 
Skyline Court’s decision to affirm the state’s expansive reach regarding fraud prosecution). 
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sellers should not preclude them from being afforded the same statutory 
remedies as buyers.190 
It was not until the 2007 Murphy decision that such an unforeseen 
variation in the typical securities transaction tested the breadth of Ohio’s 
Blue Sky antifraud statute.191  Based on the precedent set forth herein, 
both the Ohio state courts and the federal courts appeared willing to 
construe the antifraud regulation in the Ohio Blue Sky Law as broadly as 
they saw fit in the particular situation, bearing in mind the possibility of 
an unforeseen variation.192  But in a move seemingly contrary to the 
judicial reasoning of prior cases interpreting Ohio Blue Sky Law, the 
Northern District of Ohio did not construe section 1707.43 broadly; 
rather, the court strictly adhered to the plain language of the statute.193 
Applying the unambiguous language of section 1707.43, the district 
court concluded that the Plaintiffs—determined by the court to be the 
sellers in the stock transaction—were not entitled to rescission under 
section 1707.43.194  Following the precedent of prior decisions such as 
Nickels, the district court applied the language of section 1707.43 to the 
facts—Plaintiffs did not “purchase” stock, and therefore, they were not 
                                                 
190 See infra Part IV (for this Note’s proposed model statute and commentary). 
191 Murphy, 498 F.3d 386. 
192 See, e.g., Columbus Skyline, 660 N.E.2d at 429 (holding that broad statutory language is 
essential in order to account for unforeseen situations); see also supra Sections II.C.1–3. 
193 Murphy v. Stargate Defense Corp., No. 1:05 CV 2121, 2006 WL 721746, at *1 (N.D. 
Ohio Mar. 21, 2006), aff’d in part, denied in part, 498 F.3d 386 (6th Cir. 2007).  In reaching this 
conclusion, the court relied on Nickels v. Koehler Mgmt. Corp., 541 F.2d 611, 616 (6th Cir. 
1976) for the well-settled interpretation of section 1707.43 that the law “provides a remedy 
only for a defrauded purchaser, and not for a defrauded seller.”  Murphy, 2006 WL 721746 
at *12 n.1. 
194 Id. at *12.  Surprisingly, and maybe most telling of the subtlety of the issue, is the fact 
that the court simply concluded the following without much analysis:  “The March 18, 2005 
transaction must be excluded from Plaintiffs’ claims under the Ohio Blue Sky Law because 
Plaintiffs were sellers in the last transaction and the Ohio Blue Sky Law does not provide a 
remedy for defrauded sellers.  Id.  The only legal reasoning undertaken by the court was in 
a footnote.  See id. at *12 n.1.  In this footnote, the court addresses the buyer/seller 
distinction in a stock-for-stock exchange and follows the plain meaning of the statute: 
While neither party has addressed this issue, the Court’s research 
indicates that Ohio’s blue sky law provides a remedy only for a 
defrauded purchaser, not for a defrauded seller.  In this case, Plaintiffs 
were purchasers in the first two stock purchases on January 25, 2002 
and February 4, 2002.  Plaintiffs were the sellers in the stock-for-stock 
transaction on March 18, 2005.  Accordingly, their only recourse as 
defrauded sellers in the March 18, 2005 transaction is their federal 
cause of action under 10b-5 and their state law claim for common law 
fraud. 
Id. (emphasis added).  In so reasoning, the court references Nickels, most likely for the 
proposition of the unambiguous standard that the “law provides a remedy only for a 
defrauded purchaser, and not for a defrauded seller.”  Nickels, 541 F.2d at 616. 
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entitled to the rescission provision of section 1707.43.195  But this surface 
analysis of the stock-for-stock exchange, although it is consistent with 
the statutory language, is nevertheless inconsistent with the purpose of 
the statute, as well as the interpretation of this purpose by Ohio courts.196  
As these courts have reasoned, the definition of a “purchaser” should be 
construed broadly to include one who acquires by an exchange of 
securities.197  Indeed, it is this tension that proved to be the source of the 
Sixth Circuit court’s disagreement with the district court.198 
Fortunately for the Plaintiffs in Murphy, the Sixth Circuit Court of 
Appeals undertook a more critical analysis of section 1707.43’s exclusion 
of sellers.199  The court’s reasoning went beyond a cursory analysis of 
section 1707.43 and supported Plaintiff’s argument that because the deal 
was a trade, both parties acted as purchasers.200  Looking to the purpose 
of Ohio Blue Sky Law, and specifically the unique nature of the 
transaction, the court reasoned that Plaintiffs should be treated as 
purchasers.201  The reasoning of the Sixth Circuit Court is twofold:  first, 
the purpose of the Blue Sky Law is to prevent the advertising of 
worthless securities; second, with this purpose in mind, the Court 
proceeded to apply a prior interpretation of an Ohio appellate court to 
this unique factual situation in order to give section 1707.43 an equitable 
interpretation.202 
Ultimately, the Sixth Circuit court reached the proper result in 
Murphy, in spite of section 1707.43’s omission of an explicit right of 
rescission to a defrauded seller in a stock-for-stock exchange.203  
Reaching this conclusion, the Sixth Circuit court reasoned that both 
parties were purchasers and provided a section 1707.43 right of 
rescission to Plaintiffs; this Note, however, ultimately contends that this 
interpretation is unnecessary because the rationale for providing the 
right of rescission to sellers in certain circumstances is the same as the 
                                                 
195 See supra note 194 and accompanying text. 
196 See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
197 See Murphy v. Stargate Defense Sys. Corp., 498 F.3d 386, 391 (6th Cir. 2007); Indem. 
Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Kircher, 191 N.E. 374, 376 (Ohio Ct. App. 1934) (“The sale of a 
security[] . . . means among other things an exchange of securities, and as one who acquires 
by sale is a purchaser, so is a purchaser one who acquires by an exchange of securities.”). 
198 Murphy, 498 F.3d at 391. 
199 Id. 
200 Id. at 390. 
201 Id.; see also supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
202 Murphy, 498 F.3d at 390; see also United States v. Tehan, 365 F.2d 191, 194 (6th Cir. 
1966) (holding that the purpose of the statute is to protect the party who is not in the 
unique position to know the facts.). 
203 OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 1707.43 (West, Westlaw through 2008 File 129 of the 127th 
Gen. Assembly); Murphy, 498 F.3d 386. 
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original rationale for providing the right to purchasers.204  To this end, 
Part III.C of this Note further explores how a stock-for-stock exchange 
demands a more comprehensive construction of Ohio’s Blue Sky Law.205 
C. The Argument for Inclusion:  Why the Murphy Reasoning Is Not 
Necessary 
An analysis of the parties in a stock-for-stock exchange leads to the 
conclusion that the distinction between buyer and seller is 
unnecessary.206  Based on the legislative history and case law 
interpreting section 1707.43, it is clear that the intent was to protect less 
knowledgeable individuals from predatory acts of more savvy and 
sophisticated persons.207  Most often, this situation is present in the form 
of an unsophisticated buyer purchasing from a savvy, knowledgeable, 
and potentially predatory seller.208  As a result, section 1707.43 is 
structured specifically with these types of transactions in mind.209  
Notwithstanding its general applicability to these standard transactions, 
the language of section 1707.43 has proven ineffective in carrying out its 
purpose to the fullest extent possible.210 
In a stock-for-stock exchange, one party acquires stock from another 
party in exchange for stock.211  Just like a transaction involving a buyer 
and a seller, the stock exchange can be viewed from the perspective of 
which party is in a better position to know all the facts.212  With a buyer 
and a seller, most often the seller is in the best position to know all the 
facts; therefore, it follows that the buyer is most likely to be a victim of 
fraud.213  Returning to the case of a stock exchange, however, there is 
                                                 
204 Murphy, 498 F.3d 386; see also supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
205 See infra Part III.C. 
206 See infra Part III.C; see also infra Part IV The author of this Note’s commentary to the 
proposed model statute). 
207 See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
208 See supra note 79 and accompanying text; see also supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
209 OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 1707.43 (West, Westlaw through 2008 File 129 of the 127th 
Gen. Assembly). 
210 United States v. Tehan, 365 F.2d 191, 194 (6th Cir. 1966) (holding that the regulations 
were intended to provide for the “general welfare . . . secur[ing] the people against 
ignorance often due from an incomplete disclosure of facts by one in the unique position to 
know the facts.”); see also Holderman, Comm’r v. Columbus Skyline Sec. (In re Columbus 
Skyline Sec., Inc.), 660 N.E.2d 427 (Ohio 1996) (creating broad, sweeping statutory language 
was necessary in order to address potential unforeseen variations). 
211 See supra note 103 and accompanying text; see also supra Part I (describing a stock-for-
stock exchange modeled after the facts in Murphy). 
212 See Tehan, 365 F.2d at 194 (differentiating the parties to a transaction based on one 
party’s “unique position to know the facts.”). 
213 See supra note 3 and accompanying text (noting that sellers of securities are the most 
common perpetrators of fraud). 
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nothing inherent in the dynamics of the transaction that makes one party 
more likely to be a victim of fraud.  Because the transaction is structured 
as an exchange, whereby either party could be more knowledgeable or 
vulnerable, it is in furtherance of public policy to grant both parties the 
right of rescission when one party becomes aware that the other party is 
acting fraudulently.  Indeed, section 1707.43 would be most fulfilling of 
its purposes either by explicitly including the right of rescission for both 
buyers and sellers, or accounting for the instance of a stock-for-stock 
exchange, and therefore eliminating the need to delineate remedies 
based on a characterization of “buyer” or “seller.”214 
Moreover, there seems to be little logic in limiting the applicability of 
the right of rescission in a stock-for-stock transaction.215  It is clear from 
both the legislative intent and case law that the statute was meant to 
enjoy a broad construction.216  Moreover, public policy dictates 
protecting those investors who might be less knowledgeable than those 
in whom they are investing, regardless of whether they are considered to 
be a buyer or a seller.217  Despite the fact that buyers are most often the 
defrauded party, this generality should not limit the breadth of a statute 
meant to serve equitable measures.218  In the end, this distinction has 
little basis in logic.219 
Ultimately, section 1707.43 needs to be amended to include all 
parties that could be victimized by fraud.  For the courts, this statutory 
clarification will remove the need for abhorring equity at the altar of 
strict statutory interpretation, and will further eliminate the need for 
                                                 
214 See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
215 See Farmer & Feldman, supra note 93, at 822 (wondering why, because misstatements 
and omissions can just as easily induce a sale as a purchase, does the statute not provide a 
civil remedy for defrauded sellers?). 
216 See Geyer, supra note 69, at 301 n.1 (quoting Ohio State Bar Association Corporation 
Law Committee Comments Accompanying the 1929 Amendments to the Ohio Securities 
Act, reprinted in HOWARD FRIEDMAN, OHIO SECURITIES LAW & PRACTICE 23 (Supp. 1994)) 
(noting that the broad, inclusive powers given to the Division of Securities will enable 
discovery, prevention, and punishment of fraud).  See United States v. Tehan, 365 F.2d 191, 
194 (6th Cir. 1966) (holding that the regulations were intended to combat incomplete 
disclosure by protecting those parties not in the best position to know all the facts); see also 
Holderman, Comm’r v. Columbus Skyline Sec. (In re Columbus Skyline Sec., Inc.), 660 
N.E.2d 427 (Ohio 1996) (creating broad statutory language to account for unconsidered 
situations). 
217 See Bronaugh v. R. & E. Dredging Co., Inc., 242 N.E.2d 572 (Ohio 1968) (holding that 
the purpose of securities regulation is to protect the public from acquiring securities that 
might be worthless or unnecessarily risky). 
218 See supra note 3 and accompanying text; see also Columbus Skyline, 660 N.E.2d 427 
(holding that the securities statute should be construed broadly, so as not to exclude 
potentially fraudulent conduct). 
219 See Farmer & Feldman, supra note 93 (noting that there is no reason for preventing 
sellers of securities from having a statutory remedy for fraud). 
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legal analysis aimed at achieving a desired result.220  Therefore, section 
1707.43 of Ohio’s Blue Sky Law should be amended to clarify the law, 
and ultimately give effect to the original intended purposes of the 
legislation. 
IV.  PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.43 
[A]s one who acquires by sale is a purchaser, so is a purchaser one who acquires 
by an exchange of securities.221 
 
Ohio’s Blue Sky Law was enacted to provide statutory relief to a 
party defrauded in a securities transaction.222  In interpreting the 
language of Ohio Blue Sky statutes, the Ohio Supreme Court has 
suggested construing the statute broadly in order to “address unforeseen 
variations in factual circumstances[,]” and ultimately not to exclude 
potentially fraudulent conduct.223  In tension with this judicial guidance 
is the clear language of section 1707.43, which provides the right of 
rescission only to “purchasers” of securities.224  Illustrative of this tension 
is the case of rescission of a stock-for-stock exchange, in which the 
parties do not fit squarely into the buyer-seller framework of section 
1707.43.225  To account for this unforeseen variation not provided for in 
the statute, this Note proposes an amendment to section 1707.43 in an 
effort to include both parties to a stock-for-stock exchange.226 
Section 1707.43 should not limit the right of rescission to buyers of 
securities.227  To realize the full extent of its purpose, section 1707.43 
should include both parties to account for fraud perpetrated in a stock-
for-stock exchange.228  The amended statute appears as follows, with the 
author’s commentary inserted throughout: 
 
                                                 
220 See, e.g., Murphy v. Stargate Def. Sys. Corp., 498 F.3d 386, 391 (6th Cir. 2007). 
221 Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Kircher, 191 N.E. 374, 376 (Ohio Ct. App. 1934). 
222 See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
223 See Columbus Skyline, 600 N.E.2d at 429. 
224 OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 1707.43 (West, Westlaw through 2008 File 129 of the 127th 
Gen. Assembly); see Nickels v. Koehler Mgmt. Corp., 541 F.2d 611, 616 (6th Cir. 1976) 
(interpreting the statutory right of rescission under section 1707.43 as follows:  “The blue 
sky law provides a remedy only for a defrauded purchaser, and not for a defrauded seller[]”) 
(emphasis added). 
225 See, e.g., Murphy, 498 F.3d at 391. 
226 See infra notes 227–48. 
227 § 1707.43 (“[E]very sale or contract for sale made in violation of Chapter 1707. of the 
Revised Code, is voidable at the election of the purchaser.”) (emphasis added). 
228 See supra notes 216–17 and accompanying text. 
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Proposed Amendment to OHIO REV. CODE § 1707.43229 
(A)  Every sale, or contract for sale, or exchange of 
securities made in violation of Chapter 1707. of the 
Revised Code, is voidable at the election of the 
purchaser or one who acquires by an exchange of 
securities.  The person making such sale, or contract for 
sale, or exchange of securities, and every person who 
has participated in or aided the seller in any way in 
making such sale, or contract for sale, or exchange of 
securities, are jointly and severally liable to such 
purchaser or one who acquires by an exchange of 
securities, in an action at law in any court of competent 
jurisdiction, upon tender to the seller in person or in 
open court of the securities sold or exchanged, or of the 
contract made, for the full amount paid by such 
purchaser or one who acquires by an exchange of 
securities and for all taxable court costs, unless the court 
determines that the violation did not materially affect 
the protection contemplated by the voided provision. 
Commentary 
First, by expanding the scope of the statute from “sale” to “sale or 
exchange of securities,” the proposed amendment clarifies its 
applicability to a stock-for-stock exchange.230  This clarification will 
ultimately free the courts from the burden of having to determine 
whether the right of rescission applies to a stock-for-stock exchange.231  
Second, and most importantly, adding after “purchaser” the phrase “or 
one who acquires by an exchange of securities” will allow for the 
inclusion of both parties to a stock-for-stock exchange.232  No longer will 
the courts be forced to categorize parties in order to determine the 
applicability of the statute.233  As a result of this change, no longer will 
                                                 
229 The proposals are the contributions of the author.  Proposed additions are underlined, 
and proposed deletions are struck out.  The language in regular font is taken from 
§ 1707.43. 
230 See § 1707.43.  See also Indem. Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Kircher, 191 N.E. 374, 376 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1934).  Here, the Court was forced to categorize a stock-for-stock exchange as a sale.  
Id.  The court reasoned, “The sale of a security . . . means among other things an exchange 
of securities, and as one who acquires by sale is a purchaser, so is a purchaser one who 
acquires by and exchange of securities.”  Id. 
231 See supra note 220. 
232 See § 1707.43. 
233 See, e.g., Murphy v. Stargate Def. Sys. Corp., 498 F.3d 386 (6th Cir. 2007). 
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the right of rescission in a stock-for-stock exchange be limited to the 
party determined by the court to be the “purchaser.”234 
(B)  No action for the recovery of the purchase price or 
rescission of the exchange as provided for in this section, 
and no other action for any recovery based upon or 
arising out of a sale, or contract for sale, or exchange of 
securities made in violation of Chapter 1707. of the 
Revised Code, shall be brought more than two years 
after the plaintiff knew, or had reason to know, of the 
facts by reason of which the actions of the person or 
director were unlawful, or more than four years from 
the date of such sale, or contract for sale, or exchange of 
securities, whichever is the shorter period. 
 
(C)  No purchaser or one who acquires by an exchange 
of securities is entitled to the benefit of this section who 
has failed to accept, within thirty days from the date of 
such offer, an offer in writing made after two weeks 
from the date of such sale, or contract of sale, or 
exchange of securities, by the seller or by any person 
who has participated in or aided the seller in any way in 
making such sale, or contract of sale, or exchange of 
securities, to take back the security in question and to 
refund the full amount paid by such purchaser or void 
the exchange of securities. 
Commentary 
In the second and third sections of proposed section 1707.43, the 
changes made to proposed section 1707.43(A) have been incorporated.235  
Additionally, the right to “refund the full amount paid by such 
purchaser” has been supplemented with the option to “void the 
exchange of securities.”236  In parts (B) and (C), the proposed amendment 
seeks to expand the right of rescission that was limited to a purchaser of 
securities to both parties in a stock-for-stock exchange.237 
                                                 
234 See id.  Constrained by the limitation of section 1707.43 to purchasers of securities, the 
Court in Murphy was forced to reason that, in a stock-for-stock exchange, one party 
effectively purchases shares from the other corporation.  Id. at 391. 
235 See supra notes 230–34. 
236 See § 1707.43. 
237 See supra notes 206–20. 
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Opponents of the proposed amendment are likely to make the 
following arguments.  First, states have the police power to regulate 
securities fraud as they see fit, so why should Ohio broaden its statute?238  
Second, because the Uniform Securities Act of 1956 does not extend 
statutory protection to sellers, why should Ohio Blue Sky Law?239  Third, 
if the statute does not provide an explicit right of rescission, why not 
pursue common law remedies that are already in place?240  Each of these 
arguments is addressed in turn. 
The first argument can be attacked simply by looking to the intent of 
Ohio Blue Sky Law, and determining that limiting the right of rescission 
contravenes the goal of broad, sweeping applicability vis-à-vis 
regulating fraud.241  Second, relying on section 410 of the 1956 Act 
simply begs the question.242  Third, forcing one party to resort to 
common law remedies necessitates an inherent distinction between the 
two parties, and this Note contends that there is no logical reason for 
providing the right of rescission to one party but not the other in a stock-
for-stock exchange.243  Moreover, it is the party in the position not likely 
to be aware of all the facts that should be afforded the statutory right of 
rescission, and in the case of a stock-for-stock exchange, either party can 
potentially assume this position.244 
Ultimately, this proposed amendment to section 1707.43 would 
eliminate the need for such judicial reasoning found in the quote at the 
heading of this section.245  No longer will courts be forced to construe 
parties to a stock-for-stock exchange as either a “purchaser” or a 
                                                 
238 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).  
Speaking to the state and federal regulation uniformity debate, Justice Brandeis noted that 
“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if 
its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory[,] and try novel social and economic experiments 
without risk to the rest of the country.”  Id. 
239 See supra notes 46–47. 
240 See Geyer, Miglets, & Rowley, supra note 89, at 941 (noting that Ohio common law 
supplements the Securities Act with attractive alternatives in the form of state common law 
fraud claims); Matia, supra note 89 (discussing the various remedies available to parties in 
securities transactions). 
241 See supra notes 79, 83. 
242 UNIF. SECURITIES ACT § 410(a), 7A U.L.A. 568 (1958), reprinted in LOSS & SELIGMAN, 
supra note 18, at 65; see also supra note 80 (noting that Ohio is not a Uniform Securities Act 
jurisdiction; and consequently, it has used more expansive language pertaining to fraud). 
243 See supra notes 215–19. 
244 See United States v. Tehan, 365 F.2d 191, 194 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that states should 
provide regulations that “tend to secure the people against ignorance often due from an 
incomplete disclosure of facts by one in the unique position to know the facts[]”) (emphasis 
added). 
245 See supra note 221. 
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“seller.”246  As a result, no longer will such parties seeking rescission 
under section 1707.43 find the fate of their claim in the hands of judicial 
interpretation.247  The proposed amendments to section 1707.43 will 
expand the applicability of the statute, both fulfilling the original intent 
of Ohio Blue Sky Law and eliminating the possibility of inconsistent 
judicial interpretation.248 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Returning to the rescission claims set forth in Part I, B’s suit against 
A in state court for rescission of a stock-for-stock exchange under current 
section 1707.43 will likely be successful, but surely not guaranteed.249  
Likewise, after the Murphy court clarified the issue, Z’s suit against Y in 
federal court will also likely be successful.250  Unfortunately for both B 
and Z, to rescind statutorily a stock-for-stock exchange under current 
section 1707.43, the court must first find that they are each a “purchaser” 
of securities.251  Inconsistent judicial interpretation should not be 
determinative; both B and Z are entitled to the assurance that the right of 
rescission will be available to them under the statute.  For this reason, it 
is clear that section 1707.43 needs to be amended to expand the scope of 
its applicability. 
It would be naïve to expect statutes to account for the potentiality of 
all unforeseen variations in factual circumstances.  If this were the case, 
then our judiciary would cease to function as an interpreter of the law.  
However, it is through judicial interpretation that the law grows and 
develops.  If the courts find vagueness or ambiguity in the language, 
then the legislature needs to amend its language.  In the case of remedies 
available to a defrauded party in a stock-for-stock exchange, Ohio courts 
                                                 
246 See, e.g., Murphy v. Stargate Def. Sys. Corp., 498 F.3d 386, 391 (6th Cir. 2007). 
247 See supra Part III.C (describing how courts have interpreted the language of Ohio’s 
Blue Sky Law, specifically the rescission provision of section 1707.43). 
248 See supra Part IV. 
249 See Nickels v. Koehler Mgmt., 541 F.2d 611, 616 (6th Cir. 1976) (“The blue sky law 
provides a remedy only for a defrauded purchaser, and not for a defrauded seller.”).  But if 
the state court were to abide by the instructions of the Columbus Skyline Court to construe 
the statute broadly in order “to address unforeseen variations in factual circumstances[,]” it 
would likely find that B is entitled to the right of rescission.  Holderman, Comm’r v. 
Columbus Skyline Sec. (In re Columbus Skyline Sec., Inc.), 660 N.E.2d 427, 429 (Ohio 1996). 
250 498 F.3d at 391 (“[P]laintiffs should be regarded as purchasers for purposes of Ohio’s 
Blue Sky Law . . . .  The sale of a security . . . means among other things an exchange of 
securities, and as one who acquires by sale is a purchaser, so is a purchaser one who 
acquires by an exchange of securities.”) (quoting Indem Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Kircher, 191 
N.E.374, 376 (Ohio Ct. App. 1934)). 
251 See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.43 (West, Westlaw through 2008 File 129 of the 127th 
Gen. Assembly). 
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have spoken.  After the Murphy Court’s analysis of section 1707.43, it is 
clear that the statute needs to be amended. 
J. Liam Gruzs∗ 
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